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Abstract 
The present study is a comparative approach to revolutions and their effect on population 
health during the post-conflict period.  Specifically, it attempts to determine whether revolutions 
that are accompanied by a coup d’état have a significant negative impact on post-revolution 
population health.  Degree of revolutionary violence, governmental structures, and pre-
revolution health systems is of particular interest as relevant variables.  The study focuses on the 
Latin American countries of Nicaragua and Chile due to their similar region and timeframe.  The 
revolutions and accompanying coup d’état in both of these countries do not demonstrate different 
patterns on public health in the post-conflict period; rather, governmental structure and regime 
type were found to be more influential on a nation’s post-revolution health status than the 
occurrence of a coup d’état.  It has also been found that the implementation of effective 
programs, community participation, and population expectation are the primary factors that 
influence post-revolution health status.  
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We all want to change the world 
But when you talk about destruction 
Don't you know that you can count me out? 
- John Lennon 
Section I: Introduction and Background 
Introduction 
The traditional scholarly consensus repudiated the use of regime characteristics as a 
legitimate method for comparative policy, particularly for healthcare.  Since they based their 
claim using dichotomies, however, this consensus gradually changed as the body of literature 
evolved;1 indeed, a dichotomous categorization of revolutions does not always aptly account for 
the complexity of the socioeconomic situation.  A combination of regime characteristics, 
revolution types, the presence of coups d’état, and relevant health determinants is necessary to 
comprehensively analyze the efficacy of healthcare reforms and the health status of post-
revolution countries.  
Despite the contending definitions of revolution and coup d’état, a general foundation 
may be derived from common criteria and processes, which may then be tailored to a country- or 
region-specific analysis.  The success and severity of revolutionary impact are determined by the 
presence of several interactive elements, of which violence is a potentially superfluous attribute, 
as well as the degree of resultant sociocultural change.  The most acute of scenarios results in a 
military dictatorship or authoritarian regime, but a more mild change would simply be the 
replacement of governmental personnel.  Understanding the severity of revolutionary processes 
and tactics will determine its impact on society and thus public health. 
                                                 
1
 Thomas John Bossert, “Can We Return to the Regime for Comparative Policy Analysis?  Or, The State and Health 
Policy in Central America,” Comparative Politics 15 (July 1983), 419. 
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“Revolution” Terminology and Parameters 
Purpose 
Understanding revolutionary nature and theory will help to determine the change and 
impact on post-revolution public health and health status.  However, scholars have described the 
study of revolutions to be somewhat nebulous and the study of coups d’état even more nebulous 
still.  Such an amorphous sociopolitical phenomenon as a revolution cannot be explained with a 
rigid and fixed definition; this is not to say that all parameters should be eliminated, but rather 
that it should not be the primary debate.  What constitutes “revolution” and its impact on social 
systems and regimes should be sufficient to at least distinguish between revolutionary 
occurrences according to the levels of government, nation, and region. 
Although a specific understanding of each revolution will be analyzed in its own right to 
determine the specific changes unique to the nation, as “it is the original aspects of a particular 
revolution which determine its success or failure,”2 a general theoretical approach illuminates the 
shared commonalities among revolutions.  The following list of contending definitions, albeit not 
exhaustive, provides an interrelated account of revolutionary theory, process, and outcome. 
Contending Definitions, Theories, and Varieties of Revolutions 
Defining the “Fever” of Society 
Chalmers Johnson defines a revolution as a form of social change, which often “involves 
the intrusion of violence into civil social relations,” including “peasant jacqueries, urban 
insurrections, military coups d’etat, conspiracies plotted by revolutionary associations, and 
                                                 
2
 Lawrence Kaplan, introduction to Revolutions: A Comparative Study, ed. Lawrence Kaplan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1973), xv. 
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domestically supported counterrevolutions” as either a rebellion or revolution.3  These processes 
are intended forms of violent action, organized and planned to initiate societal change, for a “true 
revolution is neither lunacy nor crime.  It is the acceptance of violence to cause the system to 
change when all else has failed, and the very idea of revolution is contingent on this perception 
of societal failure.”4  As the purpose of society is to eliminate violence and foster cooperation 
among its citizens, violence in the form of revolution indicates a collapse of the social system.5 
Based on his set parameters, some societies thus have revolutionary potential and/or 
proclivity.  Indeed, Socrates asks of Adeimantus in the Republic, “Now, the best things are least 
liable to alteration or change, aren’t they?  For example, a body is altered by food, drink, and 
labors, and all plants by sun, winds, and other similar affections – but the healthiest and strongest 
is least altered, isn’t that so?” (Republic, Book II, 381e).6  “Unhealthy” or unstable societies are 
those in which revolutions are more likely to occur, and Johnson believes that the comparative 
method “must be devoted to comparing potentially revolutionary societies.”7 
Although Johnson does not consider rebellions and revolutions as dichotomies, he does 
differentiate between the two along a continuum and further divides them into (1) “simple” 
rebellions, (2) “simple revolutions,” (3) “total” rebellions, and (4) “total” revolutions.  While a 
simple rebellion does not have an accompanying ideology and is exemplified by such 
occurrences as a jacquerie, a total revolution aims at a total restructure of the society.  This 
spectrum of varieties corresponds to the various levels of society; for example, “institutionalized 
changes” within the government may result in simple rebellions, “fundamental changes” within 
                                                 
3
 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966), 1; 6-7. 
4
 Johnson, 12-14. 
5
 Johnson, 8-12. 
6
 Quote translated in Michael L. Morgan, ed., Classics of Moral and Political Theory (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 2005). 
7
 Johnson, 7. 
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the regime may lead to ideological rebellions or simple revolutions, and a “change in basic 
political consciousness” may lead to total revolutions.8  Earl Conteh-Morgan expands Johnson’s 
spectrum to include the (1) Jacquerie (mass or peasant rebellion), (2) Millenarian rebellion 
(religious and idealist rebellion), (3) anarchistic rebellion (antinationalistic or Utopian rebellion), 
(4) Jacobin communist revolution (“classic revolution”), (5) conspirational coup d’état (an elitist 
revolution), and (6) militarized mass insurrection (elitist and nationalistic).  He further 
differentiates between the rural targets of “traditional monarchies” such as seen in France, 
Russia, and China and the urban targets of “modern dictatorships” as seen in Mexico, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Iran, and the Philippines.9 
A classification of revolution by their various tactics rather than ideologies is a type of 
reductionism and can lead to “widespread confusion over the very meaning of revolution,” 
because not all tactics are revolutionary.  Johnson warns that the “sources of change” do not 
necessarily predict the type of revolution that will occur, and further states that an obsessive 
pursuit of such stipulation may result in “excessive abstraction and superficiality;” thus, he 
would consider a coup d’état as a tactic that could lead to a revolution rather than a form of 
revolution. 
Johnson insists that a comparative study of revolutions must also include a comparison of 
social systems; otherwise the analysis will lack theoretical consistency.10  In her work concerning 
the social revolutions of France, Russia, and China, Theda Skocpol contrasts each country with 
(1) “instances of non-social revolutionary modernization” and (2) “instances of abortive social 
revolutions.”  She controls for variation and compares the cases for phenomena which may be 
                                                 
8
 Johnson, 122-127. 
9
 Conteh-Morgan, Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts 
(New York: Routledge, 2003): 163-165. 
10
 Johnson, 129; 136. 
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present in one and not the other.  In all three cases, she found that there was a tendency for 
peasant insurrection and military disorganization.11  Her methods effectively evaluate each case 
both in their own context and comparatively to determine any commonalities or differences. 
Although “revolution” can be a loose term, Crane Brinton states that the common “core” 
definition for revolution in the field of politics is a “drastic, sudden substitution of one group in 
charge of the running of a territorial political entity by another group hitherto not running that 
government.”12  Similar to Johnson, Brinton abhors absolute precision of definition, for “he [the 
scientist] is interested less in beauty and neatness of definition than in having his definitions fit 
not his sentiments and aspirations, but the facts.”13  He also distinguishes between the healthy 
and unhealthy society, or rather societal equilibrium and disequilibrium.  Societies in equilibrium 
are stable and have members who respond “predictably to given stimuli;” “as new desires arise, 
or as old desires grow stronger in various groups, or as environmental conditions change, and as 
institutions fail to change, a relative disequilibrium may arise, and what we call a revolution 
break out.”14  Disorder is certainly a universal tendency of all societies at one time or another, for 
discontent is an inherent proclivity, but a healthy and generally stable society is one in which 
tensions and criticism exist in a tolerable amount.15 
The analogy between revolution and disease is deepened, symbolically representing 
revolutions as fevers; the old regime preceding the revolution perceives discontent through 
“prodromal signs” such as societal restlessness that is not quite the presence of revolution.16  The 
disease only becomes present when symptoms arise, indicating that the revolution has begun.  
                                                 
11
 Theda Skocpol, “France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 18 (April 1976): 177; 209. 
12
 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books), 4. 
13
 Brinton, 11. 
14
 Brinton, 15-16. 
15
 Brinton, 27-28. 
16
 Brinton, 65. 
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Eventually a crisis takes place, which is followed by a period of “convalescence” and perhaps 
several relapses.  The society, represented as the body, may become stronger from the revolution 
or illness in the form of a more effective government.17 
Revolutionary Process and Criteria 
Peter C. Sederberg provides a repetitive yet necessary account of thirteen contending 
definitions of revolution, including those of notable scholars such as Charles Tilly and Samuel P. 
Huntington.  Despite this range of perspectives, Sederberg states that revolutions share the four 
main characteristics of process, duration, direction, and outcome of which process and duration 
are the two most disputed elements, and outcome includes the degree of change within regime 
personnel, institutional structure, socioeconomic structures, and basic culture. 
Each of these elements are weighted differently; Sederberg argues that “no lower-scale 
alteration of personnel, structure, or culture is really revolutionary.  A shake-up of the class 
structure or basic cultural values, in contrast, clearly satisfies the expectation of significant 
change.”18  Criteria for a revolutionary process differ among scholars, as some consider outcome 
more important or violence as a superfluous trait.19  Some scholars argue that revolutions are 
sudden or have a short time span, while others argue that they can be more prolonged; Sederberg 
does not discount either perspective, and rather elucidates the possibility that attributing the 
quality of suddenness may be due to the revolutionaries’ intention for sudden change, whether it 
is realized in actuality or not.  Sederberg also states that revolutions are naturally distinguished 
                                                 
17
 Brinton, 17.  It must be noted that he defines society merely to indicate the collective individual for behavior, and 
he is careful to mention that there is a distinction between metaphysics and science in light of the “soul” of 
revolution and the body politic. 
18
 Peter C. Sederberg, Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change (New York: HarperCollins 
College Publishers, 1984), 54-57. 
19
 Sederberg, 57-58.  The author also recognizes that nonviolent regimes are of particular interest when considering 
revolutionary process.  Gene Sharp recognizes that the regime’s method of control or coercion can be ineffective 
against the populace who refuses to accept their authority and cease to respond. 
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from other social transformations depending on the guided direction and social movements 
behind them.20 
He concludes with his own definition that a “revolution is a significant change 
deliberately wrought over a relatively short time through a strategy involving considerable 
coercion,” in which the change brings a revolutionary outcome, the coercion is the revolutionary 
strategy, and the strategy is implemented by revolutionaries.21  He states that coercive violence is 
an intentional harm that attempts to achieve political significance with “mutual interaction” 
among the population.  Stable societies tolerate “acceptable force” such as strikes to achieve 
predictable control of this interaction, whereas unstable societies harbor “unacceptable violence” 
such as revolutions.22 
Much like Johnson, Jack A. Goldstone states that “many of the characteristics of 
revolutions reflect the conditions of revolutionary struggle per se;” therefore, despite their 
different ideologies and backgrounds, revolutions usually follow a general process.23  State 
breakdown is caused by a seemingly delicate process and combination of fiscal distress, elite 
alienation, and mass mobilization.  A drain in the state resources strains the societal balance and 
decreases state authority, leading to a potential neopatrimonial state through “borrowing, new 
taxes of dubious legality, and simple corruption.”  Elite loyalty is tenuous without state bribery 
and both the military and bureaucracy become ineffective.  If the elite are alienated, then a crisis 
in the form of “a war, a collapse of state credit, or superpower pressure” will likely lead to 
revolution, for “revolutionary struggles arise only when elites are severely divided – a united 
                                                 
20
 Sederberg, 58-61. 
21
 Sederberg, 61-62.  It must be noted here that the author believes it to be a rare occurrence to have all three factors 
of outcome, strategy, and revolutionaries. 
22
 Sederberg, 38-45.  Sederberg’s typologies of violence are organized according to degree, and will be discussed in 
more detail under “Revolutionary Spectrum.” 
23
 Jack A. Goldstone, “An Analytical Framework,” in Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, ed. Jack A. 
Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 47. 
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elite, opposed to a government that is weak in resources, can simply stage a coup d’etat and then 
alter government policies.”24  According to Goldstone’s “interactive model,” a revolution will 
only occur when these two elements are combined with mass mobilization in the form of 
demonstrations or riots.  This “revolutionary conjuncture” of the three main factors can be 
exacerbated by several elements such as rapid price inflation, population growth, nationalism, 
the emergence of “professional groups,” corruption, power concentration, and economic shifts.25 
Similar to the other scholars, Goldstone explains that the revolutionary process is 
accompanied by a gradual ideological change, which usually begins conservatively.  As the state 
continues to lose its authority, conservative ideologies transform into radical ideologies, 
rendering counterpropaganda ineffective.  An ideology must be widely accepted to gain popular 
support and radical enough to contend with other competing radical ideologies.26  A highly 
organized and conservative coalition successfully forms in order to solve the unavoidable 
problems of the state that persist into the post-revolutionary period.  They gain the interest and 
support of essential groups through the strategies of rectification to address “formal grievances,” 
redistribution of private property to address “material grievances,” and nationalism to villainize 
enemies in order to unite the population.  “Thus, a nationalist policy, involving strong leadership 
and action against external ‘enemies,’ is often the key to restoring national unity and order.” 27  
Thus, military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes are often welcomed, as they “embod[y] the 
fervent nationalism that is the common denominator to which most revolutions are eventually 
reduced.”28 
                                                 
24
 Goldstone, 38. 
25
 Goldstone, 40-42.  Johnson also alludes to this theory of “conjunction.” 
26
 Goldstone, 44. 
27
 Goldstone, 46-7. 
28
 Goldstone, 47. 
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Similar to Sederberg’s distinctions, James DeFronzo differentiates a reform movement, 
which “attempts to change limited aspects of a society but does not aim at drastically altering or 
replacing major social, economic, or political institutions,” and a revolutionary movement, “in 
which participants are organized to alter drastically or replace totally existing social, economic, 
or political institutions.”29  Similar to several scholars preceding him, DeFronzo considers 
violence as a likely attribute of revolutionary movements and differentiates between the two 
types of “people’s war” and “guerrilla warfare.”30 
He presents his own “conjunction” approach to understanding revolutions and states that 
there are five particular factors necessary for success.  “Mass frustration,” which creates popular 
uprisings among the population, is a result of “relative deprivation” (or Goldstone’s “injustice”) 
caused by increased expectations with decreased standard of living and governmental 
capabilities.  Also similar to Goldstone are “dissident elite political movements” and “unifying 
motivations” such as nationalism.  Aligned with Sederberg’s theory, a “severe political crisis” 
that impedes the “coercive capabilities of the state” and takes advantage of “a permissive or 
tolerant world context” creates the opportunity for a successful revolution.  Revolutions are 
unsuccessful if the concurrence of all of these five factors does not take place, particularly that 
which unifies a population.  Indeed, “nationalism, as a spur to unified action, and economic 
redistribution, as an antidote to mass frustration, join together with the other major revolutionary 
factors…to explain many sociopolitical upheavals of the past and, perhaps, those of the centuries 
to come.”31  DeFronzo states that most revolutionary theories share the commonalities of mass 
frustration and the inability of the state to deal with rising mass expectations.  International 
                                                 
29
 James DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 8. 
30
 DeFronzo, 8-9. 
31
 DeFronzo, 10-11; 18-22; 27. 
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permissiveness is an additional, albeit less acknowledged, factor that creates an amenable 
environment for revolutions.32 
Drawing from his scholarly predecessors of revolutionary theory, DeFronzo created an 
original revolutionary sequence which begins as an intellectual opposition to the old regime.  
The old regime then attempts reforms, but internal conflicts arise from a “revolutionary 
alliance.”  The moderate post-revolution government that is established soon collapses and gives 
way to a wave of radicalism.  Radicalism is in turn taken over by extremism and coercion in 
order to fulfill the revolution’s goals, and “more pragmatic moderate revolutionaries” eventually 
replace them.33  This revolutionary process can also be seen with Brinton’s “accession of the 
extremists,” where the legal government, led by the moderates who have established prestige, 
financial resources, and institutions, is challenged by their “rival” illegal government run by the 
extremists.  The moderates prove to be weak and inadequate due to their liabilities and 
“virtuous” responsibility to rights, and unwillingly concede to the extremists.34 
As with DeFronzo, Conteh-Morgan differentiates between (1) revolutions which attempt 
to alter the status quo and (2) riots, violent demonstrations, and civil wars which affect state 
integrity.  He claims that only “profound” alterations to society truly constitute a revolution, 
since they alter the values, structure, institutions, and elite leadership of the society in which it 
occurs, whereas coups d’état do not have a lasting effect on the societal structure.  Unlike the 
previous scholars, Conteh-Morgan is more concerned with a stipulated definition of revolution, 
and considers the “perfect revolution” to have the specific attributes of (1) “an overthrow of the 
government by its own subjects, carried out from within the state,” (2) “the old ruling power elite 
replaced by a new one from within the state,” (3) “mass insurrection, involving violence or the 
                                                 
32
 DeFronzo, 25-26. 
33
 DeFronzo, 22-23. 
34
 Brinton, 134. 
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threat thereof,” and (4) “a transformation of the old social system.”35  Of course, this is not very 
different from the “conjunction” theories of Goldstone and DeFronzo. 
Revolutionary Spectrum 
Degrees of Revolution, Political Change, and Violence 
 In his work Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change, Sederberg has 
included several tables that clearly display the various and complex dimensions of a revolution 
and the potential violence that accompanies it.  Indeed, “the notions of violence as a means and 
revolution as an end of political struggle receive special attention.”36  His compilations are 
particularly useful in determining the degree or severity of revolution and revolutionary violence, 
which allows for adequate categorization and thus a better foundation for comparative methods 
of analysis. 
 Based on Goldstone’s theories of revolution, Sederberg has composed a comprehensive 
table that displays the degree of revolution from stability to total “great revolution,” 
corresponding to eight different attributes; the lack of all attributes indicates political stability, 
while the presence of all eight attributes indicates a total revolution and political instability.  In 
line with several of the aforementioned theorists of revolution, the two particular attributes only 
present in a total revolution are a change in both the “status systems of traditional elites” and the 
“economic organization” of a society, indicating the clear severity and impact of such an 
occurrence.37  The author states that “no lower-scale alteration of personnel, structure, or culture 
is truly revolutionary.  A shake-up of the class structure or basic cultural values, in contrast, 
                                                 
35
 Conteh-Morgan, 156-157. 
36
 Sederberg, 8. 
37
 Sederberg, 60-61. 
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clearly satisfies the expectation of significant change.”38  For Sederberg and several of the 
aforementioned scholars, the degree of change is a significant aspect, and determines the degree 
of revolution.   Somewhat more controversial than degree and severity of revolutionary change is 
the presence and degree of violence.  Accepting scholarly vacillation concerning violence as a 
necessary characteristic, Sederberg does not discount it as a possible significant factor within 
some revolutionary occurrences.39 
 
  
                                                 
38
 Sederberg, 55-56. 
39
 Sederberg, 47-53. 
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Table 1-1: “Crisis, Breakdown, and Revolution: An Inventory of Attributes”40 
(1=Attribute present; 0 = Attribute absent) 
“G
reat”
 
rev
olutio
n
 
P
olitical
 
rev
olutio
n
 
S
ecessio
nist
 
civil
 w
a
r
 
D
y
n
a
stic
 
civil
 w
a
r
 
C
o
n
serv
ativ
e
 
p
olitical
 
refo
rm
 
N
o
rm
al
 co
up
 
d
’état
 
S
u
ccessful
 
rep
ressio
n
 
Stability
 
T
yp
e
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
0
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
0
 
W
id
esp
read
 
elite/p
op
ula
r
 
alien
atio
n
 
fro
m
 state
 
A
ttrib
ute
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
0
 
1
 
0
 
0
 
Elite
 rev
olts
 
ag
ain
st
 state
 
1
 
1
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
P
op
ula
r
 
rev
olts
 
ag
ain
st
 state
 
o
r
 elites
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
W
id
esp
read
 
violen
ce
 o
r
 
civil
 w
a
r
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
0
 
1
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
C
h
a
ng
e
 in
 
p
olitical
 
in
stitutio
n
s
 
1
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
C
h
a
ng
e
 in
 
statu
s
 sy
stem
 
of
 traditio
n
al
 
elites
 
1
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
C
h
a
ng
e
 in
 
eco
n
o
m
ic
 
o
rg
a
nizatio
n
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
C
h
a
ng
e
 in
 
legitim
izing
 
sy
m
b
ols
 a
nd
 
b
eliefs
 
 
                                                 
40
 Sederberg, 60. 
  
14 
 
Table 1-2: “Forms of Domestic Violence”41 
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The Coup d’État 
Placement on the Spectrum 
There is considerable debate whether a coup d’état is a type of revolution or distinct from 
it.  Most tend to agree that a coup is “a stroke of force at the particular rulers of an established 
system of government, usually executed by members of the ruling group, but not aimed at 
changing the system.”42  For other scholars such as David C. Rapoport, the debate on whether a 
coup is a revolution type is not as significant as recognizing its unpredictability and “extra-legal” 
political meaning.43  The general consensus seems to consider a coup as a potentially 
revolutionary tactic if successful, but not a revolution in itself; coups that do not lead to 
revolutions are merely considered “acts of traitors or as instances of international subversion.”  
Johnson states that a coup is theoretically welcomed if the system is in need of change, and 
revolution may break out if the elite resist this change.44  As can be seen with Goldstone’s and 
Sederberg’s representation of revolutionary change, a coup is not an isolated incident.45  Coups 
differ in concept to the greater development to which they contribute; therefore, “the mere fact of 
a coup does not imply any change in the social structure of society.”46 
Bruce W. Farcau provided quite a profound and concentrated study on the coup d’état, 
evaluating its nature as well as its form of execution.  He describes a coup to be a nebulous 
phenomenon to analyze due to its secretive nature, as it gains attention only toward the end or 
after its occurrence and the documentation surrounding it is often unreliable.  In his study, he 
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considers the coup to be internal in nature, much like a “heart attack or a paralyzing stroke from 
within the body politic,” and favors a more vague definition proposed by Edward Luttwak, in 
which a coup is described as “the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state 
apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder.”47 
Despite all of its planning and organization, the physical act of a coup is “a short, sharp 
action aimed at the seizure of the key functions of a state’s ruling system, usually coming to 
fruition or failure within the space of twenty-four hours from the first overt act to the collapse of 
either the target government or of the plot.”48  Farcau believes that due to its brief and specified 
nature, coups are likely to be nonviolent in nature or do not need violence to be considered a 
coup.49  Indeed, according to Sederberg’s degrees of violence and attributes, a coup has neither 
widespread violence nor a high level of destruction and is also relatively low on its degree of 
change and revolution type.50 
Farcau provides the general process despite its uniqueness among different countries, and 
divides it into the preparatory phase (or “control”) and the active phase (or “neutralization”); the 
presence of violence depends on the success of the preparatory phase.51  A coup generally begins 
with the formation of plotters who agree on a commitment to their plan.  After they attempt their 
first trial rebellion, they publicly declare the coup and seize the central governmental power.  If 
successful, they announce the newly created government and formally name its new members.  
The first two constitute the preparatory stages, which determine the success and amount of 
bloodshed that will likely take place.  Although these stages are often ignored by the literature, 
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Farcau states that they can provide clues as to what kind of regime will take over and the degree 
of change that may follow.52 
Frequency as a Possible Characteristic 
Latin America has an unusually high proclivity for coups d’état; Carl J. Friedrich states 
that coups d’état are “frequent in unstable monocratic systems, especially dictatorships and 
tyrannies.”53  Rapoport states, although somewhat jaundiced, that violence is an inherent facet of 
the governmental structure in this part of the world, and Huntington similarly likens a Latin 
American revolution and coup to a type of election.54  “The Latin American military has brought 
the coup d’état to the state of an art form which is only poorly copied in other societies.”55  Such 
frequency can even create a certain psychological conditioning among the population, removing 
the stress that would usually accompany such an event.  Although only one coup accompanied 
the revolutions of Nicaragua and Chile, unlike the several coups in such countries as Argentina 
and Honduras, the mentality may yet seep into their cultures. 
“Health” Terminology and Parameters 
It seems, given the revolutionary spectrum, that revolutions and coups are likely to have a 
significant impact on the health status and infrastructure in the post-revolution period.  
Understanding public health and healthcare systems in general will help to understand its 
connection with revolutions and the causal relationship they may embody.  Although Bernard J. 
Turnock focuses on the American public health system to derive his conclusions, his work is 
useful to establish the basic concepts of public health from which a more country- or region-
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specific understanding may draw upon.  He provides a list of contending definitions and explains 
the complex inter- and multi-disciplinary nature of public health. 
Defining Health and Public Health 
 Health and wellness are difficult terms to define;56 however, several scholars agree that 
health is not mutually exclusive with disease, and that the concept of health has evolved from a 
negative definition to a more positive one.  The negative perspective, which developed during a 
period of continuous epidemics, focuses on health as the absence of disease, indicating that 
health and disease are of the same spectrum or continuum.57  Conversely, the positive 
perspective developed as knowledge in public health increased and placed health and disease on 
different spectrums, “with wellness and illness in one dimension and the presence or absence of 
disease or injury in another.”58  The positive perspective defines health as the ability for people 
to meet their normal roles and duties within society, creating a higher, albeit more subjective and 
socially oriented, standard for the wellness of a population.59 
 These perspectives have revealed that disease is objective and wellness and illness are 
subjective, and has further obfuscated the determination of a society’s health status.  Thus, four 
possible health conditions exist where wellness and illness can be either with or without disease 
or injury, creating a greater difficulty in determining what constitutes health or wellness.60  
Despite its subjectivity, this “social account,” namely the “ability to live and plan one’s life 
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satisfactorily,” has surpassed the traditional indicators61 that do not fully indicate “health trends” 
within a society.62 
Sociocultural and Governmental Effects on Public Health 
 Society has a great influence on determining the definition of health; paraphrasing Hans 
Schaefer’s findings from 1976, Ernst Schroeder writes that “definitions of health and illness are 
therefore part and parcel of societies, cultures and epochs.”63  This is not to deny the possibility 
of some universal aspects of health definitions, however.  For example, the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) “definition of health as a state of complete physical, mental, and social 
well-being” can be an applicable guide to all societies; illness is generally perceived as a state 
that deviates from the norm and “is more socially than naturally determined.”64  Therefore, 
public health must have an inherently broad definition that means something different to 
different peoples;65 indeed, the definition of health in terms of an individual’s characteristics, 
which includes “functional capacity…, pain, [and] emotional state,” relates to the societal 
perspective of health and illness.66 
In an attempt to address this issue, Turnock includes a partial list that defines public 
health as (1) a “broad social enterprise or system,” (2) “professionals and work force whose job 
it is to solve certain important health problems,” (3) “body of knowledge and techniques that can 
be applied to health-related problems,” (4) “activities ascribed to governmental public health 
agencies,” and (5) “literally the health of the public as measured in terms of health and illness in 
a population.”  Despite these contending or misconstrued views, Turnock states that one of the 
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primary aspects of public health is that the health of an individual affects the health of society.67  
Schroeder similarly links the individual and society and states that according to the “medical-
scientific concept,” illness is perceived as that which creates problems for the individual and/or 
community.68  Certain diseases or ailments can sometimes be deemed as an acceptable norm 
within a culture or society; “an extreme example of clinical disease that was not regarded as 
‘being ill’ in the relevant community is pinto (dichromic spirochetosis), a skin disease that is so 
prevalent among some South American tribes that the few single men not suffering from it were 
regarded as pathological to the point of being excluded from marriage (Ackerknecht 1947).”69   
Turnock considers public health as a “movement” that constantly evolves to handle the 
health problems of a population.  The system begins with inputs in the form of “human, 
organizational, informational, fiscal, and other resources” that are carried out through processes 
or “practices.”  These practices result in outputs such as programs or interventions, which then 
create “health or quality-of-life outcomes,” or “desired results.”70  Public health is thus inherently 
political in nature and inevitably linked with the government’s influence on public policies and 
health-related programs; “history, culture, the structure of the government in question, and 
current social circumstances” influence the evolution of the society’s public health that can either 
improve or degrade according to governmental performance.71  Another implication of public 
health’s political nature is that the values of health indicators, which are simply factors that 
indicate a state of health, can change according to the change in a society’s dominant ideology.72  
It is then a logical assumption that the analysis of health indicators during a revolutionary period 
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may be problematic, but can still provide an indication of general health status when analyzed 
among correct cultural and historical context. 
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Section II: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Some argue that revolutions help to engender a need for societal improvement and public 
awareness, particularly of health policy, while others argue that health status was usually the 
same if not better in the pre-revolution period.  Healthcare in both Nicaragua and Chile improved 
after the revolution, most effectively at the community level with organizations such as the 
Comités de Defensa Sandinista (Sandinista Defense Committees, CDS) and the Asociación de 
Mujeres Nicaraguenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza (Nicaraguan Women’s Association, AMNLAE) 
of Nicaragua, as well as the Asociación Chilena de Proteción de la Familia (Chilean Family 
Protection Association, APROFA) of Chile.73  However, as will be made clear in the coming 
sections, regime types differed between these two countries. This apparent inconsistency leads to 
confusion as to what regime types or how regime change can significantly influence healthcare. 
Classifying Regimes and Regime Change 
To determine at least a general effect of revolutions on health status and public health 
policies, be they positive or negative, it is first necessary to classify regimes to understand the 
nature of the change.  Understanding the nature of revolutionary regime change can also 
determine the significance of coups d’état on post-revolution health status.  Unlike defining 
revolution, regime types require a more precise definition and classification, as “regime labels 
are essential for analyzing comparative historical processes, for describing regimes, and for 
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studying regime breakdowns and transitions.”74  To overlook the complex diversity of regime 
types and their changes would be both simplistic and inaccurate, but it must be understood that 
“no nation’s political system is likely to be a pure regime type…  Regimes are not only mixed 
but can change over time.”75  Naturally, this sentiment has created contending definitions and 
classifications within the literature, concerning not only the criteria for designation but also the 
number of categories and how countries should be classified. 
Focusing on Latin American countries, Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal 
Pérez-Liñán have organized regime types according to their “trichotomous ordinal scale” which 
labels regimes as democratic, semidemocratic, or authoritarian.  In their study, they recognize the 
inherent subjectivity in organizing regime typologies and claim that their ordinal scale eliminates 
the more rigid dichotomies, the latter of which “better captures the significant variations in 
regimes.”76  Other studies of particular interest to Latin America, such as those by John W. 
Sloan, Guillermo O’Donnell, or Karen L. Remmer and Gilbert W. Merkx, acknowledge the 
many variations among regimes but still characterize them as either democratic or a type of 
authoritarianism.77  Both groups of scholars, proponents of either the dichotomous or the 
trichotomous classification, are able to delve deep into Latin American politics; however, they 
have distinct advantages and disadvantages that create differences between them.  The former, 
for instance, has the ability to compare the changes in policy performance on a more general 
scale, whereas the latter accounts for specific regime change that can be used to determine 
possible patterns concerning coups d’état.  Although the present study will mainly draw upon the 
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more progressive trichotomous scale to analyze data, the dichotomous organization will also 
prove useful in understanding some key differences in regime type and change. 
Regime Types 
The Trichotomous Classification 
The trichotomous ordinal scale clearly stipulates opposing characteristics for regime type, 
namely democratic and authoritarian, but still allows flexibility in its classification by including 
the intermediary regime “semidemocratic.”  For Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán, a 
democracy is a regime in which four necessary criteria must exist in conjunction, namely (1) 
“free and fair competitive elections for the legislature and executive,” (2) “inclusive adult 
citizenship,” (3) “protect[ion of] civil liberties and political rights,” and (4) the election of 
governments that “really govern and the military is under civilian control.”78  A truly democratic 
state exhibits all four of these criteria, while a semidemocratic states falters in up to three criteria.  
Another fundamental differentiating factor is that change in a democratic government is achieved 
by elections rather than coups.79 
The advantage of trichotomous classification can be exemplified with El Salvador and 
Guatemala during the 1980s when “free and fair elections with a broad suffrage” yet had the 
“absence of an effective guarantee of civil liberties,” or with Argentina, Honduras, and 
Guatemala in which the military guardianship as a constraining factor for civilian control; the 
authors label these states as semidemocratic, as some “elements of democracy are impaired in 
some fundamental way.”80  They state that to simply label these faltering democracies as 
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authoritarian is “misleading,” especially when considering the complexity of post-1978 Latin 
American regimes.81 
Dichotomy and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism 
 It seems that the majority of other scholars are not as sympathetic to an intermediary 
regime type between democracy and authoritarianism; a regime is either a democracy with 
democratic characteristics or it is authoritarian with the absence of these characteristics.  Other 
scholars, however, incorporate the more particularized characteristics of Latin American regimes 
and have labeled the nondemocratic regime type as the more indicative “bureaucratic-
authoritarian” or “modernizing authoritarian.”  Nonetheless, they argue that democracy is an 
“authentic and persistent motif,” but one that is intermittent.82 
Bureaucratic-authoritarianism, a term most notably identified with Guillermo O’Donnell, 
is “likely to occur in nations that have undergone relatively substantial bureaucratization, 
industrialization, and mass mobilization,” and is “an elite response to the alleged policy failure of 
a democratic regime.”83  O’Donnell states that the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarianism 
especially in Brazil and Argentina can be attributed to three fundamental elements, including (1) 
“the growing political weight of lower middle- and working-class groups,” (2) “the appearance 
of economic ‘bottlenecks,’” and (3) “the increased significance of technocratic roles.”84  Various 
political crises play key roles in the emergence of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in 
advanced societies (i.e., Brazil 1964, Argentina 1966 and 1976, and Chile and Uruguay in 1973), 
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as well as the formation and execution of a coup coalition.85  With a key component of the 
regime being modernization, it “is a type of military rule often interpreted as novel in relation to 
the early history of Latin America.  It was generally led by the military as an institution, in 
contrast to the personalistic rule of individual officers,” and is often “accompanied by intense 
repression” as well as coercion.86 
Some scholarly proponents of bureaucratic-authoritarianism compare the advantages of 
this regime with those of democracy and state that it promotes economic growth “by freeing the 
technocrats from democratic accountability” in order to “pursue economic strategies that aid 
elites at the expense of most of the population.”87  It has been argued, however, that economic 
growth and restoration in these regime types have a higher probability of success if the level of 
“crisis and threat” is low in the pre-revolution period.88  Remmer and Merkx describe 
O’Donnell’s concept of threat as that which affects the socioeconomic stability, the 
consequences of which are repression and “political deactivation.”  The presence of the latter 
factor in particular progresses the bureaucratic-authoritarian state from its “first stage” of 
attracting foreign capital to its “second stage” in which a nationalist bourgeoisie class is 
instituted into the ruling class.89  Despite these findings, Remmer and Merkx admit that threat 
levels before the coup only partially explain changes in economic performance.90 
Nonetheless, from a democratic perspective, this economic superiority is only a short-
term advantage as these regimes “inevitably become rigid, self-serving, corrupt, and incapable of 
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adjusting policy priorities to changing conditions.”91  It seems that only “democratic regimes 
have the policy capabilities to achieve a variety of developmental goals without suffering the 
high levels of repression that often accompany bureaucratic-authoritarian rule;”92 in other words, 
although democracies may be laden with time-consuming procedures that can slow economic 
progress, they do not advocate repression as a means to this economic end.  The trichotomous 
scale would find the combination of these democratic and nondemocratic characteristics as 
semidemocratic, as it is not outright authoritarianism; however, it is nevertheless difficult to 
gloss over the illegitimate means of repression. 
Indeed, O’Donnell recognizes the inability for bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes to 
achieve legitimacy.  Remmer and Merkx succinctly summarize his defining characteristics of 
this regime and state that “its dependence on international capital weakens its claims to represent 
the nation; it is self-imposed rather than based on the consent of its citizenry; and it transparently 
serves the interests of the upper bourgeoisie, rather than the people.”93  Fundamental changes in 
the political system and economic structure with a regime change to bureaucratic-
authoritarianism.94 
Latin American Cases 
The revolutions in neither Nicaragua nor Chile could be classified among the “grand” or 
“total” revolutions of Russia, China, or France; these Latin American revolutions were of a 
different essence, without a version of Trotsky to accompany their political upheaval in history.  
However, as seen in the previous section, the classification of “revolution” has evolved 
throughout the years, becoming more inclusive.  Although the events in these two Latin 
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American countries may not be quite as grand as the revolutions preceding them, they are 
nevertheless counted as revolutions by several notable scholars of worthy academic standing.  A 
brief definition of their revolution, coup, and regime change would benefit this discussion. 
Gurr and Goldstone state that Nicaragua had state crises, elite alienation, mass 
mobilization, revolutionary struggle, and the successful outcome of the revolutionaries over the 
old regime;95 based upon the aforementioned trichotomous scale, its regime changed from 
authoritarian (under the Somoza family) to semidemocratic (under the revolutionary 
Sandinistas).  Chile, on the other hand, experienced a somewhat different change, but there was 
no doubt that its revolution was a similarly significant polity change, from democratic (with a 
long history of electoral competition), to bureaucratic-authoritarian (under General Pinochet).  
The revolution in Chile was slightly more complicated and subtle than that of Nicaragua, as it 
was mired by conspiratory tactics masked by the democratic process. 
Despite the slight differences between the two revolutions, both Nicaragua and Chile 
changed their political leadership through a coup d’état.  There is some debate whether these can 
be classified as coups; the Coup Data Codebook disqualifies Chile’s 1973 coup, Farcau similarly 
disqualifies Nicaragua’s 1979 coup.  However, the present study disagrees with these 
disqualifications since the leaders Somoza and Allende were forcibly ousted, albeit by means of 
formal resignation (considered autogolpes, or self-coups).  The level of violence or number of 
coup conspirators should not be the sole determining factors in classifying these coups; both 
coups were a revolutionary tactic, as each played a part in changing the political or social system 
of the country. 
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Powell and Thyne consider coup attempts to be “illegal and overt attempts by the military 
or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive,” and is successful if “the 
perpetrators seize and hole power for at least seven days.”96  Some scholars would not consider 
an autogolpe, or self-coup, to be considered a true coup d’état;97 indeed, Farcau does not 
consider the overthrow of Anatasio Somoza during the Nicaraguan Revolution to be a coup 
d’état, because it is a conflict of longer duration.98  However, both Nicaragua and Chile exhibited 
sufficient political pressure on the leader as to indicate an indirect overthrow that would have 
otherwise led to eventual assassination.  In addition, Nicaragua’s revolution had elements of both 
rural against urban (urban revolution) and urban against the center (revolutionary warfare).99  
These coups were also used as revolutionary tactics to dramatically change either the polity 
(Chile) or social structure (Nicaragua) of the country. 
 Ted Robert Gurr states that “a coup d’état in the pre-revolution situation can forestall 
massive violence, for example, by removing hated symbols of political repression and offering 
hopes for the alleviation of deprivation.”100  Contrary to the predictions of O’Donnell, Chile’s 
1973 coup gave rise to extreme violence despite its “high threat.”101  However, Chile’s high level 
of threat in its pre-revolution period did indeed hinder economic growth, but this is only a partial 
explanation.  Although there is a difference between the two countries concerning violence and 
the probability of economic recovery in the post-revolution period, it has been made clear that 
neither economic decay nor the level of violence accompanying the coup d’état necessarily 
affects healthcare or health status. 
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Coup d’État and the Latin American Military 
The presence of a coup indicates a government’s institutional limits and capabilities, and 
a “coup-prone society, a praetorian society,” has a small portion of the population engaged in 
politics while the rest are apathetic.102  Huntington explains that a coup d’état can occur from the 
struggle for power among the classes; since the creation of the more modern society, the officers 
involved are often from the middle classes, and it is this middle class military that represses the 
lower masses that demand redistribution of resources.  This is a neo-Marxist view in that the 
military has a similar interest with the bourgeoisie to politically expel these masses from 
participation, a situation that can create the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime as exemplified by 
1960s Brazil and Argentina and 1970s Chile and Uruguay.103 
Modernizationists such as Huntington believe that this middle class military can help 
develop society, whereas Determinists believe that the development of Latin America contrasts 
the interests of both the military and bourgeoisie.  “It is the military, however, that is especially 
sensitive to the need for modernization in order to augment the military power of the state.”104  
However, Farcau disagrees with the Determinist argument and states that class origin should not 
make a considerable difference in military sentiment; furthermore, the officer is physically and 
socially isolated from civilian society by immersion, losing the once shared commonality and 
engendering hostility toward civilians.  He also argues that the military is usually at odds with 
the interests of the bourgeoisie, as they tend to favor laissez-faire economics and comparative 
advantage.  Therefore, the military enacts a coup d’état regardless of middle class interests.105 
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Coups d’état seem to be a normal method of governmental change in Latin America, and 
at times have had a hand in revolution, considered by some to be a “revolutionary coup d’état.”  
However, some scholars distinguish between varying degrees of coups d’état such as a palace 
revolution (sovereign replacement from within), cuartelazo (military uprising, democratic), 
putsch (military uprising, conspiracy), golpe de estado (military uprising); Farcau describes the 
former two as successful coups while a putsch is an instance of limited military mobilization.  He 
also states that coups take on a more traumatic definition within democratic regimes than in 
others, while the perpetual normalcy with which coups are mostly viewed in Latin American 
societies may contribute to underdevelopment and instability.106 
There is a limitation to the significance of a coup d’état within revolutionary situations.  
Coups are not linked to high revolutionary potential and do not have high ideological 
involvement.107  Nor do they necessarily ensure that the change in government will solve the 
problems.  “Once the military seizes the reins of government and finds itself confronted by the 
same intractable problems that overwhelmed its predecessors, the stage is set for factional 
conflict within the military, and a succession of apparently unending coups d’état.”108  A coup 
depends on motive and opportunity, and either succeeds when both elements are present, does 
not occur when both elements are low or nonexistent, or will fail if there is strong motivation but 
weak opportunity.  Farcau characterizes Latin American coups with opportunity but inadequate 
motivation.  “Chile was viewed as a rock of stability in Latin America, not having had a coup for 
more than a generation, but the military was always standing in the wings and had merely not 
chosen to intervene prior to its bloody assumption of power in 1973.”109  Apart from this 
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exception in Chile, the military in Latin America almost always finds a need to intervene, since it 
is “likely to be especially intolerant of the factionalism of civilian politicians and the high 
incidence of corruption typical of government bureaucracies.”110  Apart from Cuba and 
Nicaragua, Latin America in general has an abysmally small military force without proper 
equipment.  It is nevertheless well suited for coups d’état despite its general inefficiency.111 
State Characteristics 
 Thomas John Bossert accounts for socioeconomic differences among regime types by 
listing four main characteristics of (1) state power, (2) stability, (3) ideological orientation, and 
(4) “degree of democratic participation in policymaking.”  State power, he explains, is “its 
capacity to control the lower classes and at the same time pursue policies;” this power gives the 
state a technocratic bureaucracy (which is particularly indicative of a bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regime), a form of autonomy from the “dominant class factions,” and the ability to extract 
resources from its population.  Strong states successfully implement health care policies, while 
orienting the health system toward preventative care and a focus on the rural poor.112  Bossert 
explains that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are relatively stable, with a certain longevity 
(Pinochet’s regime lasted over a decade) and the “absence of significant competing elites who 
violently challenge the legitimacy of the regime.”  This seems to fit Chile quite well, but the 
third factor of “regularity of legally scheduled leadership changes” is absent.113  As for 
reformism, or the “ideological characteristics of the state,” he argues that bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes tend to pursue “progressive social policies” and “inclusionary policies” 
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which are beneficial for new health policies;114 as will be demonstrated in the upcoming Data 
Analysis, Chile and its revolutionary health policies fit the descriptions that Bossert attributes to 
a bureaucratic-authoritarian polity.  It must be noted here that Chile can easily be considered 
unstable in its pre-revolution period, based upon the factionalism reference in the Polity IV 
project; however, this can be debated, as Chile had regular electoral competition and a relatively 
high health status prior to the revolution. 
 
Table 2-1: State Characteristics of Nicaragua and Chile, Pre- and Post-Revolution115 
 
 Nicaragua Chile 
 Pre-revolution Post-revolution Pre-Revolution Post-revolution 
Leader Somoza Sandinistas Allende Pinochet 
Strength Weak Strong Weak Strong 
Stability Stable Unstable Unstable Stable 
Ideology Status Quo Reformist Reformist Status Quo 
Polity Authoritarian Semidemocracy Democracy Bureaucratic-Authoritarian 
 
Similar to the supporting logic for the trichotomous ordinal scale of regime types, Bossert 
argues that “these four dimensions give us a richer means of categorizing the state than the 
earlier simple dichotomies without ignoring the intuitive clarity of these dichotomies;” he further 
adds that this method can detect any present relationship between regime and health care 
policy.116  He suggests that democratic states that exhibit strength and stability along with 
progressive ideology are ideal for effective healthcare policies.  These factors are also 
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codependent; “for instance, weak progressive regimes would be more successful in adopting and 
implementing primary care than would weak regimes that were not progressive.”117 
Implications for Policy Analysis 
Bossert’s findings indicate that healthcare policy adoption is not sufficiently affected by 
any one of the above four factors.  Although instability in a “status quo ideology” regime may 
lead to reforms, instability or ideology alone do not account for the adoption of healthcare 
policies.  Rather, Bossert suggests that the combination of the two creates a greater likelihood of 
adopting healthcare policies.  Although there was only case study (Costa Rica) to support this 
hypothesis, the results indicated that weak and unstable regimes such as Guatemala and 
Honduras were unable to have centralized and integrated healthcare policies.  As predicted, these 
two weak regimes also heavily relied on foreign aid to support their programs, whereas the 
strong state of Costa Rica was able to fund its policies from within.118 
The methodological shift from the 1960s and 1970s to the 1980s has highlighted the 
importance on analyzing regime change in order to determine the efficacy of national policies 
such as those in healthcare.  Understanding the “broader political process” can provide context 
for policy implementation and outcome, as well as determining the regime’s economic structure; 
the latter of which is particularly beneficial when analyzing bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regimes.119  Determining the nature of a regime not only indicates the significance of its 
transformation but also allows for a deeper contextual analysis to determine the degree of 
significance. 
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Bossert argues that differences and changes in regime type can elucidate the differences 
among national programs for primary care, and includes (1) integration, (2) centralization, (3) 
participation, (4) funding level, and (5) foreign funding as fundamental indices.  Integration of 
these programs effectively reduces “inefficient duplication of effort, conflict over 
responsibilities, and projects working at cross-purposes.”120  As with other health programs, 
integration improves the overall practical efficacy and cost-effectiveness of the programs to 
ensure it achieves its potential, and can even improve the nation’s own capacity-building.121  The 
benefit of centralization over that of decentralization is debatable; Bossert argues, however, that 
when combined with integration, centralization proves to be beneficial to national policy.  
Community participation has proven to be a key determinant in implementing successful national 
policies, particularly with healthcare, as it more effectively reaches the more marginalized rural 
areas of a nation.  The funding level and the amount of foreign funding indicate respectively the 
nation’s ability to sufficiently allocate resources according to priority and its level of foreign 
dependence to implement its national programs.122 
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Table 2-2: Policy Adoption and Implementation Processes123 
 Costa Rica Honduras Guatemala Nicaragua 
Adoption Yes Yes Yes No 
Integration Integrated Integrated Fragmented NA 
Centralization Centralized Decentralized Centralized NA 
Participation Low High Moderate NA 
Funding Level High Low Low NA 
Foreign Funding Low High High NA 
 
Bossert concludes that not one of his hypotheses “relating policy adoption to single 
dimensions of the regime typology is supported,” but rather a particular combination of several 
regime dimensions and typology; “the regime characteristics that appear to be most explanatory 
are not the single dimension dichotomies of the earlier aggregate data studies but rather a 
complex relationship in which several dimensions are contingent on each other.”124  Neither 
weak regimes nor those lacking in democratic participation will necessarily shy away from 
policy adoption, particularly if they have a centralized and integrated program for appropriate 
administration.  However, Bossert has found that weak states demonstrate the proclivity to adopt 
health policies without the threatening combination of centralization and integration, but they 
will also depend heavily on foreign aid.125 
Although Bossert excludes Nicaragua’s health policy adoption, the present study argues 
that Nicaragua did indeed adopt healthcare policies mostly during the post-revolution period.  
Fragmentation, decentralization, and participation increased during the post-revolution period in 
both Nicaragua and Chile, but as seen with Table 2-1, both countries changed from a weak to a 
strong state; perhaps it is this combination, rather than regime type, that allowed for the 
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implementation of an integrated healthcare policy regardless of severely reduced foreign funding 
and the differing percentages of GDP dedicated to health expenditures. 
 
Table 2-3: Change in Health Policy in Nicaragua and Chile126 
 Nicaragua Chile 
 Pre-revolution Post-revolution Pre-Revolution Post-revolution 
Polity Authoritarian Semidemocracy Democracy Authoritarian 
Integration Fragmented Integrated Integrated Fragmented 
Centralization Centralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized 
Participation Low High Moderate High 
Funding Level Moderate (2.3%) High (5.8%) Low (1.1%) Low (1.7%) 
Foreign Funding High Moderate High Low/Moderate 
 
Regimes are not entirely related to health policy adoption.  As will be seen with supporting 
evidence in the coming sections, Nicaragua implemented successful health policies without 
depending on foreign aid.  Although its health status was initially lower than that of Chile from 
the start, it made significant progress throughout its post-revolution period.  Its improvement 
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cannot be adequately attributed to its change to democracy.  Although Chile began with a higher 
status than Nicaragua, it still witnessed improvement in healthcare and health status despite its 
change to bureaucratic-authoritarianism. 
“Healthcare” and “Improvement” 
 What is meant by “improvement” must be made clear.  Improvement will constitute the 
overall progression of health status within the country, indicated by such factors as the decrease 
of infant mortality rate (IMR), increase of life expectancy (LE), and adoption of inclusive 
policies.  This will be significantly expanded to include other factors in Data Analysis.  Human 
rights abuses will be acknowledged, but the analysis of health status improvement will focus on 
the abovementioned factors. 
 It is difficult to ascertain which new health policy is truly a result of the revolution, since 
revolutionary countries approach healthcare changes differently.  “It is extremely difficult to 
isolate the impact of health care systems from the impact of other variables, not the least being 
socioeconomic change.”127  During the coup- and revolution-prone decades of 1960 to 1980, 
many countries demonstrated impressive progress in health status and healthcare policies; Latin 
America as a whole showed significant IMR reduction from 107 per 1,000 in 1955-1960 to 61 
per 1,000 in 1980-1985.128  Thus, it is argued that the emphasis on better public health can be a 
more ubiquitous occurrence, and need not depend on revolution.129   
Bossert states that this “primary care approach” can be the focus of revolutionary efforts, 
however, but this assumption must include the factors of (1) “greater equality of access to health 
services, both by increasing services to lower classes, and most important, by providing access in 
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the rural areas where large populations previously had no access at all,” (2) “improved 
preventative measures such as provision of clean water, sanitation, nutrition, immunizations, 
maternal and child health – activities which are more likely to improve health than are physician-
oriented curative services,” (3) “considerable participation of communities in establishing local 
health priorities and implementing local health programs,” and (4) “equity, prevention, and 
participation” within the allocated national budget.130  Thus, a focus on rural access, preventative 
medicine and community-based programs to increase health literacy are fundamental factors in 
healthcare improvement. 
Latin American Tendencies 
Sloan found that both democratic and authoritarian regimes have demonstrated improved 
capabilities in education and health.  Democratic regimes have shown considerable improvement 
from 1960-1980, such as a general increase in LE from sixty to sixty-nine years.  Although Latin 
American authoritarian regimes mostly outperformed their democratic counterparts in education 
and literacy as seen in Argentina and Chile, health policies were overall less impressive.  It must 
be noted that literacy rates in these particular countries were already impressive prior to the 
regime change, however; “in the 1980s, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico had over 95 percent of 
their children between the ages of six and eleven in school.”131  Health and education systems 
must be inherently strong to withstand any regime changes, for Sloan notes that democratic 
regimes are more flexible and thus able to successfully adapt.  High adaptability depends on a 
high level of institutionalization, and “success in adapting to one environmental challenge paves 
the way for successful adaptation to subsequent environmental challenges.”132 
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 In general, healthcare policies that focus on maternal and child health and basic sanitation 
in conjunction with adequate education will improve the health status of a country.133  Two 
particular studies on healthcare policy and revolutionary regime change have listed four relevant 
factors that indicate the level of policy performance, including (1) urbanization, (2) the economy, 
(3) income inequality, and (4) rural access.  Both agree that the economy does not have a 
significant impact on health policy performance while income inequality is the primary negative 
element, “including when controls are inserted for overall affluence and even for absolute 
poverty.”134 
Although a lower GDP per capita disallows for resources such as food and shelter, it is 
not necessarily an inhibiting factor for improving health status.  Cuba and Venezuela are prime 
examples in which health status improved greatly despite their slow economic growth, thus 
rendering the “healthier is wealthier” sentiment inaccurate.135  Furthermore, one study found that 
“improvements in earlier years had occurred in Chile during a period marked by several 
recessions, hyperinflation, and unemployment.  In fact, the evolution of improved infant and 
child health proved to be independent of economic cycles.”136  A high IMR generally occurs in 
countries with low GDP per capita, but mostly when it is compounded by low administrative 
capacity; programs and educational interventions as forms of preventative medicine will help to 
improve such mortality rates.137  Indeed, as seen in Chile, environmental factors such as safe 
water and basic sanitation affected the neonatal IMR more than that of postneonatal, but this 
reversed as healthcare became more organized and available.138 
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The level of a country’s development is also a tenuous link to revolutionary change in 
healthcare; a study on Chile’s success in healthcare theorized that “the country, although still 
only at a middle level of development, has reached levels of attainment comparable with those of 
higher-income countries.”139  Nevertheless, access to the rural population is fundamental for 
improving the health status of a nation, as well as the somewhat counterintuitive increase in 
urbanization as seen in Chile.140  James W. McGuire and Laura B. Frankel argued that Cuba’s 
pre-revolution government was even more successful than its post-revolution government.  After 
the revolution, however, it was the combination of the “expansion of health care, family 
planning, education, sanitation, and water provisioning among the poor, together with its 
redistribution of income in favor of the poor” that continued its success in health status.141  One 
study noted, however, that the disparity between urban and rural communities has been diluted, 
as rural housing, doctor to patient ratio, and the lack of hospital beds were inequitable.  However, 
the number of medical personnel was greatly expanded and available service was a priority, 
albeit at the cost of quality.142 
Summary 
It has been suggested in this limited literature review that the level of development, 
economic status, and wealth do not affect healthcare policies as much as urbanization, income 
inequality, rural access, and a focus on preventative (rather than curative) medicine.  
Furthermore, public health policies may or may not be affected by regime change itself.  
Although healthcare becomes a focus in the post-revolution period, the “permanence of primary 
care policies” in the post-revolution period depends on the strength of the healthcare system in 
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the pre-revolution period.143  Military coups d’état can nevertheless inhibit democratic 
development, and modernization affects health determinants more than “government 
provisioning of social services.”144  The adoption and success of healthcare policy also depends 
on (1) the success of healthcare policy in various regimes, and (2) determining the health status 
and polity after the occurrence of a coup d’état and revolution. 
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Section III: Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
The health status of a population can be determined by a numerous and sometimes 
complex set of determinants.145  This complexity is especially true during times of crisis such as 
revolutions and coups d’état when data may be skewed or lost, or even exaggerated.  Culture also 
plays an additionally complicating role in determining the perspective of health performance. 
Methodology for Data Analysis 
Longitudinal and cross-cultural studies are made difficult to pursue since determinants 
constantly change.  Additionally, “the more varied the conditions to which the measure is going 
to be applied, the more universal and the less specific the measure will have to be.”146  Thus, the 
case studies in the present analysis focuses on the two Latin American countries of Nicaragua 
and Chile in order to include more specific health indicators and thus gain a more precise 
understanding of how revolutions affect health status and if coups d’état are indeed a 
compounding factor. 
Section IV first briefly introduces each of the selected countries with pre- and post-
revolution historical context, from which their respective revolutions can be classified according 
to the trichotomous ordinal scale as defined by Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán.  This 
history also provides relevant context to elucidate any other factors that may influence post-
revolution healthcare efforts and health status, as well as provide a timeline for referencing data.  
Health status and the efficacy of health programs can be partially determined through indicators 
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such as IMR, LE, and crude death rates.  The IMR tables are colored according to polity changes 
to display the association between regime and health.  Health indicators are further cross-
referenced with indicators such as GDP figures, the GINI Index, and education levels to 
determine the influence of a revolution and coup d’état on social and economic aspects, or lack 
thereof.  Some comparative remarks are then made to elucidate any similarities or differences 
between the two countries.  Determinants are supported by official data provided by such 
databases as Polity IV and the World Bank, as well as the data presented in the previous section 
such as Sederberg’s degrees of violence and revolution. 
Defining Health Indicators 
 Health status should be thought of in terms of outcome, which is the “improved health 
status in the population” as the “desired results” of outputs.147  The efficacy of health 
interventions is determined by examining the outputs of health policies, programs, and services 
with such variables as the number of physicians and the level of community involvement; health 
programs are also useful in that they “detect early and presymptomatic stages of certain diseases” 
through preventative care.148  Health status can be determined by indicators such as IMR and LE.  
Thus, both health status and the efficacy of health interventions provide useful indications of 
post-revolution performance. 
 Quite simply, a health indicator indicates a state of health and the changes in that state.  
As stated in the previous section, health is commonly seen as the absence of disease, but illness 
is not necessarily the presence of disease.149  It was also stated that measures of function are best 
used with the sociomedical definition because it indicates the quality of life.  The measure of 
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disability and the “diagnostic conditions giving rise to the disability” are necessary to truly 
understand health status.150  Dominant ideology can change the values of indicators, but it must 
be understood that ideology can change as well as within revolutionary change.151 
Types of Health Indicators 
 Disease and mortality are often used as measures for health status rather than actual 
health; although “mortality as a proxy for health” has inherent problems, Turnock argues, it can 
be used to gain a general understanding of population health status.152  Turnock has divided 
mortality-based indicators into four types.  The first is the fundamental crude mortality in which 
the “deaths within the entire population…are not sensitive to differences in age distribution of 
different populations.”  The second measure creates more specificity of the first and is labeled 
age-specific and age-adjusted mortality, which measures the “number of deaths to the number of 
persons in a specific age group;” IMR is included in this measure.  Third is LE, a commonly 
used indicator for comparative purposes and is a “computation of the number of years between 
any given age…and the average age of death for that population.”  Finally, the years of potential 
life lost (YPLL) “places greater weight on deaths that occur at younger ages,” where an arbitrary 
age is used to “measure the relative impact on society of different causes of deaths.”153 
 WHO defines child mortality rate as the probability of death before the age of five while 
IMR is the probability of death before the first year; the latter thus includes neonatal (birth to one 
month) and postneonatal (one month to the first year).  Child and infant mortality rates are 
relevant indicators to determine the nation’s child health status as the name implies and the 
                                                 
150
 Nord-Larsen, 106; Donald Patrick and Sally Guttmacher, “Socio-Political Issues in the Use of Health Indicators,” 
in Health Indicators: An International Study for the European Science Foundation, ed. Paul M. Sweezy and Harry 
Magdoff (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), 168. 
151
 Culyer, 19; 20. 
152
 Turnock, 50. 
153
 Turnock, 51-53.  Due to the incomplete data for Nicaragua, YPLL has been omitted from this study. 
  
46 
 
overall development of the nation; IMR is a particularly useful indicator of population health in 
underdeveloped countries with incomplete data.154  It has been argued that these indicators can 
also be used to determine the level of equity, which is of fundamental value to compare health 
status and performance;155 along with the GINI Index, income disparities can be quite thoroughly 
determined.  A complicating factor that must be noted is the possible omission of abortions and 
low-birthweight infants from birth and death records, which naturally “complicate infant 
mortality comparisons, even among rich countries.”156  Further adding to this margin of error is 
disqualifying malnutrition as a cause of death, despite its usually high prevalence in rural 
areas.157  Of course, the lack of records makes it difficult if not impossible to determine the 
number of infants who fall into this category, and compel the researcher to accept that factors 
such as high abortion rates can skew mortality rates. 
Income inequality within a country can be a valuable indicator.  In a study comparing 
healthcare in post-revolution Mexico with that of Cuba, Chile, and Nicaragua four main 
variables were used to determine population health, including morbidity, mortality, incidence 
and prevalence of disease, and age and cause of death.158  Due to the extreme disparity between 
urban and rural areas, James J. Horn found that most of the mortality in Mexico was due to 
preventable diseases; it “is characterized by high rates of nutritional, infectious, and parasitic 
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diseases which are largely an outcome of poverty and its environmental cognates.”159  He also 
argues that malnutrition was the leading cause of “excessive mortality” and infectious diseases 
while the lack of potable water and adequate sanitation (together with education about sanitation) 
were cause of preventable parasitic and diarrheal diseases.160  Additionally, Turnock agrees that 
population growth compounds health problems, particularly for the poor.161  Accounting for 
income inequality demonstrates the prevalence of either preventable or chronic diseases, which 
in turn affects the need for preventative medicine (opposed to curative), rural access to health 
services, and the level of education and literacy. 
Other noteworthy determinants are education and literacy especially among women, the 
physical environment and the presence of threats, urbanization, and community involvement in 
health services and promotions.  Health system factors such as doctors per region and the doctor-
population ratio are also highly influential in determining health status.162 
Risk Factors 
Social and cultural influences focus on “socioeconomic status and poverty,” but Turnock 
states that they are largely imprecise.  Nevertheless, mortality rates differ among the different 
social classes, even in the modern era and particularly among developing countries; “differences 
in mortality appear to relate primarily to inequalities in material resources, although the use of 
educational status as a proxy for social standing” may also be related.163  Nonetheless, such 
indicators as LE are better determined among developing countries by understanding disparities 
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in income rather than simply GDP or GNP statistics.  “Societies create and shape the diseases 
they experience,” and thus “health should be viewed as a social phenomenon.”164 
  
                                                 
164
 Turnock, 45. 
  
49 
 
Section IV: Data analysis 
Introduction 
Nicaragua and Chile have been chosen for comparative study on their healthcare systems 
and health status, as they have similar revolutionary processes and time parameters.  Historical 
context for each country will first be given, followed by context and data for each country’s 
health sector.  While cross-referenced with the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLAC) and the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), 
statistics will be drawn primarily from the World Bank, and the works of scholars Garfield and 
Williams for Nicaragua and James W. McGuire for Chile.  Regime change and categorization is 
measured according to the polity classification of Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán.  They 
provide a comprehensive trichotomous and longitudinal scale that is adequate for this study.  
Polity IV will also be used to identify any periods of interregnum and factionalism that may 
create disruptions for health.  Coups d’état will be categorized according to Powell and Thyne 
and other categorizations from Section I. 
Contextual Background 
Nicaragua 
Pre-revolution History 
Prior to the revolution, Nicaragua was an oligarchic society that monopolized land 
distribution and excluded the majority of the population.  When the nation became involved with 
coffee production, it brought about a “decline in Liberal-Conservative conflict, greater stability, 
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and the consolidation of state power,” which was achieved by foreign intervention.165  Nicaragua 
is “one of the most highly urbanized countries in Latin America,” and each of its three regions 
has distinct economies.  The Pacific area in particular is linked with the United States and was 
controlled and monopolized by the Somoza to export cotton and sugar.  Inherent income 
disparities were created when the small-scale farmers were forced to work on estates.166 
The United States’ occupation in Nicaragua between 1912 and 1933 weakened the 
“development of autonomous political institutions;”167 the necessary infrastructure was not in 
place to successfully withstand socioeconomic crises, which would be particularly detrimental 
with the eventual downfall of the Somoza.  During the occupation and with the help of the 
United States Marines, Anastasio Somoza Garcia was elected as the commander of the National 
Guard by Juan Bautista Sacasa (whom Somoza would later oust to become president himself in 
1936).  Dévora Grynspan states that Somoza’s relationship with the National Guard was 
neopatrimonial and corrupt and “with the U.S. help, Somoza was able to maintain control of the 
National Guard, undermine the Liberal party, co-opt the Conservative party, and repress labor 
union and the left,” as well as barred the formation of a consolidated elite leadership.168  
Although Cesar Augusto Sandino and his supporters attempted to oppose Somoza’s control of 
the National Guard, both he and his supporters were assassinated by Somoza’s command.  After 
Somoza was assassinated in 1956, the power remained in the family as his two sons Luis 
Somoza Debayle and Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza Debayle assumed leadership, the latter of 
whom was especially repressive in his methods.169 
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Infrastructural investments during the 1950s and 1960s expanded Managua’s financial 
and commercial capabilities and improved GDP and literacy rates.  Together, the Somoza family, 
Liberal, and Conservative oligarchic factions monopolized the economy in tandem.  The Somoza 
family took advantage of their piece of monopoly and placed themselves at an advantageous 
position with land and infrastructure, this resulted in greater landholding for the Somoza and 
dispossession for peasants, therefore increasing the urban population from 19% in 1950 to 47% 
in 1970 (which would continue to rise to 54% in 1980). 
The “favorable international conditions and high growth rates” that helped the Somoza 
family began to decline in the 1960s with the emergence of state crises, and Nicaragua could not 
keep up with the high rate of urbanization.  By the 1970s, 41% of the urban population and 80% 
of the rural population were poor, and 42.4% and 55.4% respectively were in extreme poverty.170  
Extreme inequality, uneven land distribution, low literacy levels (25%), a small working class, 
and a poor majority were dangerous elements to compound on a society.171  The economic crisis 
and 1972 earthquake merely exacerbated the brazen corruption of the Somoza regime, and broke 
the tenuous coexistence of the Somoza, Liberal, and Conservative parties, inciting elite 
opposition.  The earthquake enticed the Somoza family to siphon international aid, which 
brought to light the true level of their corruption; indeed, “the 1972 earthquake was the main 
catalyst for popular mobilization and upper-class defection.”172 
  
                                                 
170
 Grynspan, 93-94. 
171
 Sanderson, 49. 
172
 Garfield and Williams, 3; Grynspan, 95-96. 
  
52 
 
Figure 4-1: Nicaragua: GDP per capita growth (annual percentage)173 
 
  
It was at this time of economic and natural crises that the Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional (FSLN)174 was established and gained influence, and in turn granted the worker and 
student groups significant oppositional power upon joining forces.  In 1974, the editor of La 
Prensa Pedro Joaquin Chamorro established the Union Democrática de Liberación (Democratic 
Union of Liberation, UDEL), accompanied by other similar groups began to form and involved 
students and the working class, namely the Partido Liberal Independiente (Independent Liberal 
Party, PLI), Partido Socialista Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Socialist Party, PSN), and the Partido 
Social Cristiano Nicaragüense (Social Christian Party of Nicaragua, PSCN); the Group of 
Twelve, or Los Doce, formed in 1977 and “was to be the basis of the future revolutionary 
government.”175 
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These organizational efforts of the opposition were met with extremely violent 
repression, which increased instability and crisis within Nicaragua.176  It was heavily suspected 
that the Somoza family ordered the assassination of Chamorro due to his reports on the 
plasmaferesis pharmaceutical company run in partnership between the Somozas and Arnoldo 
“Vampire” Ramos; blood plasma, which was mostly donated by the poor due to the economic 
crisis, was sold to the United States.  The assassination of Chamorro in January of 1978 led to a 
massive protest to raze Somoza businesses, particularly targeting the plasmaferesis.177  It must be 
noted here that there is some slight disagreement as to whether this assassination was a positive 
or negative influence on the antisomocista (anti-Somoza) movement.  Garfield and Williams 
argue that the death of Chamorro led to an insurrection led by the FSLN with a positive effect, 
whereas Grynspan believes that his death adversely affected the burgeoning movement.178  
Considering the subsequent insurrection and collapse of the Somoza regime at the hand of the 
Sandinistas, it seems that the assassination only exacerbated rebellious sentiment.  Nonetheless, 
the true impact of these antisomocista actions and the Somoza retaliation on the healthcare 
system will be described in more detail in the following subsection devoted to Nicaraguan 
health. 
Revolution and Post-revolution History 
 The mid-1970s witnessed an increase of repression and torture against the opposition as 
well as increased siphoning and corruption of international funds.  Grynspan argues that the key 
moment that elucidated the National Guard’s “impotence” and the “military capabilities” of the 
FSLN was the incident at the National Palace, where the FSLN held over 1,500 hostages until 
                                                 
176
 Grynspan, 96. 
177
 Garfield and Williams, 4-5. 
178
 Grynspan, 97; Garfield and Williams, 4-6. 
  
54 
 
their demands to release some of their members were realized.179  Additionally, the 
aforementioned strikes and protests in 1978 resulted in the death of over 5,000 of Somoza’s 
National Guard, and it was then that the other Latin American countries began to help the 
opposition.180  When Somoza guardsmen murdered ABC reporter Bill Stewart and his 
Nicaraguan interpreter Juan Francisco Espino for attempting a recorded interview, the Somoza 
dictatorship became an international concern and “the Carter administration essentially ordered 
Somoza to leave Nicaragua.”181  By withholding foreign aid and supporting the Sandinistas, “a 
maximally permissive international environment existed with regard to the revolution” and 
Somoza fled to Miami, Florida.182  After the resignation of Somoza, the National Guard 
dissolved and the post-revolution junta took over Managua on July 19.183 
As with many post-revolution governments, the Sandinistas inherited a nation in 
physical, economic, social, and political disrepair.184  Nonetheless, “the great accomplishment of 
the Nicaraguan Revolution was the destruction of the horrendous neopatrimonial dictatorship of 
Somoza and its replacement by regimes generally committed to democracy and pluralism.”185  
Indeed, the new government attempted to address the relevant issues and began to officially 
organize and created a five-person junta comprised of two private-sector representatives, an 
official FSLN representative, and two other FSLN members.  Its general characteristics can be 
considered a “mix of Marxism, Christian defense of the poor, and nationalism.”186 
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Ultimately, the new Nicaraguan government would not be able to implement its original 
intended policies and ideologies; instead these idealistic and somewhat impractical desires 
changed to address more pressing and pragmatic concerns for post-revolution reconstruction.187  
After creating an alliance with the bourgeoisie, albeit a tenuous one, the first action of the post-
revolution government was a major economic reform that nationalized private property.  The 
bourgeoisie were not given real power, however, and harbored beliefs that “the ultimate goal of 
the FSLN was a transition to socialism and thus an eventual nationalization of private 
enterprise.”188  Indeed, these reforms were eventually met with opposition when the banking 
system and other property became nationalized, despite its original popular support.189  The new 
economic policies generally led to disheartening results.  Producers of all economic sizes were 
“hurt by higher wages, government prices, and currency overvaluation as well as by low 
international prices;” the FSLN attempted to compensate the producers for this loss by offering 
land and credit reductions for landlords and peasants, but it had diminutive effect since these 
efforts did not coincide with “technical assistance” and the urban sector.190 
Similarly frustrating yet successful were the attempts of sociopolitical transformation.  
Similar to Chile in 1973, the FSLN took control of the army “to protect the revolution from an 
alliance between the bourgeoisie and the military.”191  It must be noted here that this act was 
viewed suspiciously, for 
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Sandinista domination of the postrevolution military, ostensibly to ensure the 
implementation of the goal of socioeconomic transformation to benefit the poor, 
was to be continually criticized by many outside the FSLN on the grounds that 
one political party’s control over the armed forces interfered with the realization 
of the fully democratic political system also promised by the revolution.192 
 
To boost support for the revolution, the FSLN engaged in policies to increase literacy and 
education, similar to the Cuban “literacy crusade,” and strengthened mass organizations such as 
the AMNLAE, Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo (Association of Rural Workers, ATC), 
and the Sandinista Youth-Nineteenth of July.  However supportive these organizations were of 
the revolution, they would nevertheless often disagree about policy with the FSLN.193  Despite 
the occasional methodological disagreement, official support for these groups created a sense of 
“political competency” among the people, eliminating the previous view that the wealthy 
controlled all political influence.194  Community participation was essential to uniting the people 
in a common purpose, which would later dictate the success of the healthcare system and 
subsequently Nicaragua’s health status. 
 The Nicaraguan economy experienced growth from 1980 to 1983, but declined again in 
1984.  Although the decline can be attributed to similar problems in other Latin American 
countries such as “declining terms of trade [and] a growing foreign debt,” it can also be 
attributed to revolution-specific factors such as “the disruption of production caused by 
nationalization and conflict between the private sector and the government.”195  With the help of 
the United States under the Reagan Administration, opposition to the Sandinista government 
developed into a significant counterrevolution into the contra war.  The United States’ support 
for the contras can be traced when understanding that the Somoza regime was “the most 
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dependable ally of the United States in Latin America” and that the Sandinista government was 
socialist in nature.196  In 1984, the contras became a formidable influence as the Fuerza 
Democrática Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Democratic Force, FDN), led by many from the original 
Somoza National Guard;197 this democratic initiative backed by “white propaganda” caused a 
relapse into sociopolitical instability for Nicaragua yet again. 
The counterrevolution was socially, politically, and economically detrimental to the 
development of Nicaragua, for it undermined the revolution as (1) support for the FSLN waned 
in light of a draft, (2) the physical and economic state of Nicaragua was further hampered, and 
(3) resources were reallocated from social policies to the military.198  Much of the population 
became displaced, “peasant cooperatives” became targets for the contras, and many peasants 
were recruited by the army which resulted in a declining labor force.  The counterrevolution 
greatly affected the already declining economy, with food shortages and lack of private 
investment, while U.S. sanctions only exacerbated these problems.  Despite increased land 
distribution, there was still opposition between the Sandinista government and the bourgeoisie; 
the 1984 elections were the final break between these two.199  In short, the instability caused by 
the contra war hindered progress in healthcare and impeded sociopolitical development in 
Nicaragua. 
Nicaraguan Healthcare 
The pre-revolution health system in Nicaragua was controlled from the top, highly 
fragmented, and was marked by high IMR, low nutrition levels, and preventable diseases such as 
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diarrhea.200  The chaotic administration of the Instituto Nicaragüense de Seguridad Social 
(Nicaraguan Social Security Institute, INSS) further demonstrated the inadequacy of the Somoza 
healthcare system.  Duplication, fragmentation, corruption, and personal involvement of 
leadership shaped its inefficiency.201 
Healthcare was inequitable, favoring the upper middle class in urban areas while only 
28% of the population had “effective access to modern health service;”202 such disparity between 
the rural and urban sectors for healthcare was more extreme in Nicaragua than in other Central 
American countries, but relatively similar to Chile.203  Although the GINI index is largely 
unavailable for Nicaragua before 1990, the disparity between the rural and urban areas can be 
measured with area-specific IMR and percent of the population with access to piped water.  The 
percentage of Nicaragua’s population that was poor or very poor is also indicative at 62%.204 
 
Table 4-1: Nicaragua: Estimated Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000), Urban and Rural205 
 
1975 1979 1980 1985 1990 
Rural 103 92 89 76 70 
Urban 81 76 75 66 58 
 
     
Difference 22 16 14 10 12 
 
Table 4-2: “Nicaragua: Percent of population with access to piped water”206 
 
1974 1979 1985 1987 
Rural 6 6 11 15 
Urban 72 63 76 76 
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This combination of variables demonstrates the large gap of deaths caused by preventable 
diseases and subsequently the difference in healthcare access for both groups.  It can also be seen 
that the gap in both IMR and access to water steadily narrowed, although the latter was at a 
significantly slower pace.207 
Unlike Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica, somocista Nicaragua did not bother to 
attempt improving these public health inequities.208  Quite the contrary; the National Guard 
responded to insurrection by bombing health facilities and siphoning valuable resources that 
would have otherwise maintained these buildings.  Despite their elite social status, not all 
physicians supported the Somoza regime.  However, those who joined the opposition did not 
escape the influence and repression of the Somoza government, particularly Oscar Danilo 
Rosales and Alejandro Davila Bolanos; the former was murdered in an aerial napalm attack, 
while the latter was arrested and tortured by the National Guard in 1978.  Bolanos survived this 
treatment and continued to work at the Esteli hospital to treat those injured by the Somoza, but 
when the National Guard stormed the building during a later raid, they seized him and publicly 
burned his body as a political statement.209  These types of insurrections following the 
assassination of Chamorro “marked a period of brutal destruction of hospitals, raised the need for 
curative and rehabilitative services for those wounded in the war, weakened the capacity of the 
Somoza government to maintain even the inadequate services that existed, and inhibited small 
reform initiatives.”210 
Despite the disheartening obstacles for sociopolitical and economic transformations after 
the revolution in 1979, Nicaraguan health did not take a drastic turn for the worse; in fact, it 
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seemed to have improved.211  Bossert theoretically argues that a post-revolution regime would 
strive to achieve a dedicated primary care approach because of their committed proclivity to 
improve society; however, he does admit that some regimes would not devote the costly 
resources toward greater public health if it does nothing to legitimize the regime.  Regardless of 
motivation, post-revolution Nicaragua attempted to restructure its healthcare system “in such a 
way as to achieve equity, prevention, and participation within a relatively restricted budget.”212 
The primary indication of such positive changes is clearly reflected in the consistent and 
steep decline of IMR.  One can see from Figure 4-2 and Table 4-3 that the steepest decline in 
infant mortality began in the five-year period of 1975-1980, but stagnated in the next five-year 
period of 1980-1985 due to the contra struggles.  Despite the revolution and coup, or even in 
spite of it, IMR declined with admirable speed.  Even the period of 1970-1975 that lead up to the 
revolution witnessed a more favorable decline.  It must also be noted that these steep declines 
occurred during an authoritarian polity, indicated in red. 
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Figure 4-2: Nicaragua’s Infant Mortality Rate, per 1,000 live births213 
 
 
Table 4-3: Declining Trend of Nicaragua’s Infant Mortality Rate (in percentage) 
Year 1960-
1965 
1965-
1970 
1970-
1975 
1975-
1980 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
Percent 
Decline 7.70 7.85 11.50 22.11 22.21 14.86 17.86 17.63 
 
Nicaragua’s primary focus in the health system after the revolution was the right to 
healthcare for all.  Although there were inherent complications to such an ambitious goal, the 
right to healthcare was a mentality that was soon spread, and the previously neglected population 
finally received care.214  This mentality and awareness is crucial to maintaining good health 
standing in any country, especially when considering a country like Chile in which a drastic 
regime change occurred.  The post-revolution Nicaraguan government attempted a pluralistic 
public health system for all in favor of accessing rural areas, “emphasiz[ing] preventative health 
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care, health education, and community participation.”215  Among the overall efforts to improve 
the system, the three most noteworthy were creating national health organizations, launching 
health campaigns and programs to improve health awareness and literacy, and quite significantly 
“dealing with the issue of professional versus popular control of the health system and with 
tensions between rural and urban areas.”216 
 
Figure 4-3: Nicaragua: Percentage of population completed primary and secondary (age 15+)217 
 
 
Table 4-4: “Infant deaths per 1000 live births by mother’s education” in Nicaragua218 
 No School Primary Secondary 
1966/67 136 108 57 
1973/74 112 91 47 
 
According to Figure 4-3, Nicaragua’s literacy rates changed little immediately before and 
after the revolution; in fact, there is absolute stagnation across all figures during the period of 
                                                 
215
 Garfield and Williams, 24. 
216
 Donahue, xv. 
217
 The data presented in this table is derived from Education Statistics, World DataBank. 
218
 Garfield and Williams, 259. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f P
o
pu
la
tio
n
Year
Percentage of population completed primary (female, age 15+)
Percentage of population completed secondary (female, age 15+)
Percentage of population completed primary (total, age 15+)
Percentage of population completed secondary (total, age 15+)
  
63 
 
1975-1980.  During the period of 1980-1985, however, secondary education increased 
dramatically (54.55%), particularly among women (86.36%), and it can be seen with Table 4-4 
above that the application of these literacy rates is what truly changed with the revolution. 
The organization of healthcare drastically differed from the Somoza period, morphing 
into a three-tier system composed of hospitals, health centers, and health posts.  The nationally- 
and foreign-run hospitals provided a wide breadth of care including long-term illnesses, while 
each of the several regions established ten to twenty “health areas” that provided primary care; 
health centers cared for more highly populated areas and offered more technical capabilities 
whereas health posts were offered to lower populations and concerned common illnesses and 
oral rehydration.219  A truly significant change that accompanied the reorganization, however, 
was the assignment of trained staff to rural areas, which effectively reduced inequality 
particularly within curative care.220  As seen in Table 4-5 below, the general number of 
physicians and available hospitals beds improved dramatically during 1980-1985, with nearly 
1,000 more doctors and 400 more hospital beds.  Notice the reduction of hospitals after the 
revolution, which (1) correlates well with either the focus on preventative rather than curative 
healthcare, (2) indicates the level of destructions caused by Somoza’s National Guard raids, and 
(3) indicates the replacement with community centers and health posts. 
 
Table 4-5: Nicaragua: Additional Health figures221 
 1975 1979 1980 1985 1990 
Doctors 911 1345 1212 2142 2417 
Nurses 395 640 808 1152 1589 
Beds in public hospitals 4115 4000 4677 5083 4720 
Hospitals 34 34 31 31 30 
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Community participation became the fundamental ingredient for a successful healthcare 
system to rise from the revolution’s ashes, as the lack of participation in the 1970s was due to 
low regime support.222  Widespread participation occurred after the revolution and the 
establishment of the Sistema Nacional Unico de Salud (National Unified Health System, SNUS), 
and demands and expectations from the masses grew rapidly as healthcare became an obtainable 
reality.223  The period between 1979 and 1981 marked massive construction of health buildings, 
most of which were constructed by the community rather than the government.224  Health 
education was promoted with such initiatives as “public health days” and literacy campaigns, in 
which community members were trained and spread the word in areas that would have been 
otherwise inaccessible.  Such direct participation in health reforms after the revolution was a 
non-political method of involvement to rebuild the nation.225 
 Some authors note that despite the achievements of “equity, prevention, and 
participation” within the national budget, the post-revolution health system still favored the 
urban areas, emphasized curative care, and lacked skilled administration; all factors inhibited the 
true commitment to prevention and equity.226  Although community participation in public health 
picked up where the government health facilities left off during the 1979 revolution, this 
participation was itself halted with the contra war and United States involvement.227  Indeed, in 
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1981, at the time the U.S. began funding the contras, the Reagan Administration stopped funding 
for USAID-funded hospitals, and subsequently created significant delays.228 
However, as can be seen with the above figures and tables, the healthcare system in 
Nicaragua endured even with the complications of the contra war.  “Public health campaigns 
involving the general population have involved immunizations, improved sanitation, mosquito 
control, and prophylactic antimalarial treatment,” which have been accomplished at an 
“impressive” speed even during the contra attacks of 1983;229 although the contra war greatly 
deterred participation when contra rebels began attacking civilians in 1983, the trained health 
volunteers (brigadistas) were able to provide first aid to victims and prevent disease outbreaks 
with vaccinations.230 
Timeline 
 The following timeline plots relevant events in Nicaragua beginning from its 
independence in 1838 and ending in 2000; it will also incorporate significant events relating to 
health in addition to sociopolitical occurrences.231 
 
Table 4-6: Nicaraguan Political and Medical Timeline 
 
Independence 
1838 Nicaragua becomes fully independent. 
1893 General Jose Santos Zelaya, a Liberal, seizes power and establishes dictatorship. 
1909 US troops help depose Zelaya. 
1912-25 US establishes military bases. 
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1915 Hookworm control program by the Rockefeller Foundation begins. 
1922 Malaria control program begins. 
1925 General Health Administration and “initial public health” are established. 
1927-33 Guerrillas led by Augusto Cesar Sandino campaign against US military presence. 
1930s The United States’ help leads to the development of the Ministry of Health. 
1934 Sandino assassinated on the orders of the National Guard commander, General Anastasio Somoza 
Garcia. 
Somoza dictatorship 
1937 General Somoza elected president, heralding the start of a 44-year-long dictatorship by his family. 
1956 General Somoza assassinated, but is succeeded as president by his son, Luis Somoza Debayle. 
1958 Programs concerning national eradication of malaria are initiated. 
1961 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) founded.  The FSLN was originally led by Carlos Fonseca 
Amador, Tomás Borge, and Silvio Mayorga, all of whom were from middle- and upper-class families 
with the exception of Carlos Fonseca, the “prime mover.” 
1967 Luis Somoza dies and is succeeded as president by his brother, Anastasio Somoza. 
1972 Managua is devastated by an earthquake that kills between 5,000 and 10,000 people. 
1974 December 27: Thirteen Sandinistas hold “politically prominent” hostages in response to Somoza’s 
reelection. 
Somoza declares martial law under the “state of siege.” 
1976 Carlos Fonseca dies in combat against the National Guard. 
1977 Somoza ends the “state of siege” due to negative publicity and the Carter administration, 
unintentionally allowing the FSLN to organize more effectively. 
1978 International aid began aiding the Sandinista cause, notably from Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and 
Cuba. 
January 10: Assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the editor of La Prensa and the leader of the 
opposition Democratic Liberation Union. 
August 22: FSLN seize the National Palace and hold over 1,500 people hostage. 
September: Somoza reinstates the “state of siege” in response to the politically motivated fervor among 
the youth because of August 22.  More than 5,000 people were killed. 
Sandinista Revolution (1979) 
May 29 Sandinistas launch their “final offensive.” 
June 20 ABC reporter Bill Stewart is murdered by the National Guard. 
June 23 The Organization of American States (OAS) voted to demand Somoza’s resignation. 
July 17 Somoza flees Nicaragua for Miami. 
July 17-18 Somoza’s military (National Guard) disintegrates. 
July 18 A provisional “government of national reconstruction” is established in the city of León.  In their 
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proclamation, they announce plans to form a “unified national health service.” 
July 19 The Sandinistas and the Government of National Reconstruction takes control of Managua. 
July 26 The first Cuban medical brigade arrives. 
August 1 The newly appointed Minister of Health asks, via La Prensa newspaper, that hospital directors send 
information on employees and their salaries.  Health workers have not paid for three to six months. 
The health ministry announces that vaccination campaigns will be started in a few days with the help 
of equipment donated by the West German government. 
August 2 The Interamerican Development Bank and the Organization of American States pledge, respectively, 
$20 million and $500,000 in emergency food relief. 
August 5 Headline in the new Barricada newspaper: “The Job in Health Will Be Gigantic!” 
August 6 The health ministry announces that medical brigades have arrived from Mexico, Cuba, Germany, 
Panama, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Honduras. 
August 10 The new Ministry of Health (MINSA) is inaugurated. 
August 17 MINSA announcement in La Prensa: “The permits given to exhume cadavers of those fallen in the 
insurrection are suspended immediately as a hygiene measure.” 
August 20 The Government of Reconstruction proclaims that all INSS hospitals and clinics will be opened to the 
public.  Private rooms in public hospitals are similarly abolished. 
August 27 The vice-minister of health announces: “Damage to the health system has been great, but we still don’t 
know how great.”  USAID announces a further increase in aid as 2,000 tons of food arrive. 
August 31 Health is proclaimed to be a right of the entire population.  It is announced that there will no longer be 
a fee to fill prescriptions. 
Post-revolution 
1979-81 Massive construction of health buildings takes place, mostly by the community. 
1980 Somoza assassinated in Paraguay; FSLN government led by Daniel Ortega nationalizes and turns into 
cooperatives lands held by the Somoza family. 
National Literacy Crusade begins. 
1981 The Reagan Administration stops funding for USAID-funded hospitals. 
1982 US-sponsored attacks by Contra rebels based in Honduras begin; state of emergency declared. 
1983 Contra rebels attack civilians. 
Concerning public health, maternal education takes priority. 
1984 Daniel Ortega elected president; US mines Nicaraguan harbors and is condemned by the World Court 
for doing so. 
Healthcare gains political significance. 
1987-88 Nicaraguan leadership signs peace agreement and subsequently holds talks with the contras; hurricane 
leaves 180,000 people homeless. 
1988 MINSA campaign begins to reduce infant mortality rates. 
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October: Hurricane Joan-Mirriam results in significantly more deaths and damage than other Latin 
American countries. 
Post-Sandinista era 
1990 US-backed centre-right National Opposition Union defeats FSLN in elections; Violeta Chamorro 
becomes president. 
1992 Earthquake renders 16,000 people homeless. 
1996 Arnoldo Aleman elected president. 
1998 Hurrican Mitch causes massive devastation.  Some 3,000 people are killed and hundreds of thousands 
are left homeless. 
2000 FSLN win Managua municipal elections. 
 
Chile 
Pre-Revolution History 
Unlike Nicaragua, Chile’s history is much more focused on economic conditions, 
democratic traditions, and foreign influence.  Thus, the historical context that addresses these 
factors will create a better understanding of how the coup d’état in 1973 and Salvador Allende’s 
dictatorship affected healthcare thereafter. 
Spanish colonialism, British and French involvement, and American influence and 
intervention all contributed to Chile’s economic dependence and maintained this situational 
precedent throughout the twentieth century.  Unlike other countries in which wars of 
independence took place, Chile had a strong central authority and loyal armed forces; thus, the 
class structure remained.  After its independence in 1818, Chile’s export boomed especially 
between 1845 and 1860-1875 with wheat and copper, resulting in increased urbanization and 
power for the bourgeoisie.  Liberal reforms began to take place in the 1850s in favor of 
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decentralization and “democratic suffrage,” which were truly implemented when the 
authoritarian state began to wane in power during the 1870s and 1880s.232 
Chile’s dependent economy was created by Spanish colonialism, while uneven 
competition and lessened demand in free trade resulted in socioeconomic crises.  Reforms (and 
even political restructuring) would be the original method to deal with these crises, but the 
alternative that was pursued during the 1870s was to declare war on Bolivia and Peru and annex 
the Atacama Desert in order to monopolize the nitrate supplies.  Although foreigners would later 
take over the nitrate mining, Chile’s monopoly expanded state expenditure, increased 
urbanization, and created a substantial middle class.  The market in nitrates dissolved after the 
invention of synthetic nitrate in World War II, however, which collapsed Chile’s parliamentary 
regime and increased middle class demand for reform.  The military intervened from 1924 in 
order to quell the demands, but only lasted until 1932.233 
Chile’s industrial sector developed late, compounded with diminutive interest from the 
bourgeoisie.  Copper exports soon replaced those of nitrates, though American companies 
controlled them in light of Chilean apathy toward nationalizing it.  Although the period of 1924-
1940 witnessed a return to national industry particularly under the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez 
del Campo, it again fell along with his dictatorship in 1932.  There was economic growth during 
the 1930s and 1940s under the Popular Front governments, but copper prices fell in the early 
1970s despite governmental efforts.  It became clear at this point that Chile’s economy would 
become dependent on foreign revenue.234 
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Before its collapse in the early twentieth century, the nitrate economy created quite a 
substantial working class.  Even prior to the nitrate industry, Chilean miners have a historical 
tendency dating back to 1834 to initiate uprisings and demonstrations, particularly when they 
became more organized as time passed.  During the 19th century, this working class was ruled by 
the bourgeoisie and was barred from unionizing; indeed, “union organization was difficult and 
often illegal; organizers were persecuted, and the army was regularly brought in to suppress 
strikers.”235  Once established, however, Chile’s working class struggle for autonomy against the 
bourgeoisie and their ideologies became more realistic.236 
Revolution and Post-Revolution History 
Since the workers in Chile “have a history of economic militancy and political struggle” 
that began with the nitrate era, a working class (or proletariat Marxist) revolution seemed bound 
to happen.237  It must be noted that although the ruling class partook in violent and repressive 
tactics from the 1920s until 1973, there have also been more “political solutions” adopted by the 
bourgeoisie aside from massacres and military intervention.  Nonetheless, the bourgeoisie was 
largely unified against potential threats and were able to make concessions to the working and 
middle classes, albeit with repressive sentimentality.  Their strategy was consistently “of a 
reformist alternative to Communism, the promise of fundamental change without a real 
revolution, coupled with periodic suppression of political parties or workers who would not 
submit.”238  This strategy was strengthened by the division of the workers, a large middle class 
whose beliefs tend to lie with the bourgeoisie than revolutionaries, and the promise that reformist 
policies create state employment.  Therefore, there was a choice in 1973 between revolution and 
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restoration, “the outcome decided by a military coup with a violence and degree of bloodshed for 
which there has been little precedence in Chilean history.”239 
Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat, was elected in 1964 to reform Chile’s structures.  
His progressive Revolution in Liberty reforms which differed from Marxism and thus gained 
U.S. support would cost the landowners money and some of their socioeconomic power; thus, 
the Christian Democrats were at odds with the “older and more established” national party.  
Economic conditions continued to worsen in 1966-1967, with “inflation, stagnation, high 
unemployment and underemployment, balance of payments crises and very unequal income 
distribution and access to education, health and welfare.”240  Effective changes were mainly 
concerned with the economic dependency of Chile and the “oligopolistic structure” of its 
economy.  The latter of the two was particularly problematic for Frei; there was a stunning 
amount of land monopoly (1.3% of farmers owned 72.7% of the land) and a highly skewed 
income distribution in the latifundio system that remained until 1970.241  His reforms 
exacerbated the already “combative” nature of the working class, including that of the military 
and the peasantry, resulting in numerous strikes throughout the 1960s and dramatically 
increasing political mobilization.  The Christian Democrats met these responses with more 
repression as both the U.S. military and the grupo móvil, a police riot squad, became the force 
for counterinsurgency and riot control.242 
 In the 1960s, the Left began to suspect that it would not gain power through electoral 
votes.  The Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (The Revolutionary Left Movement, MIR) 
was created by socialist students as a split from the Socialist Party, and harbored a pessimistic 
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viewpoint concerning the electoral path to power.  The Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) coalition 
was formed in 1969 as a multi-party government and policy advisor that would select a 
candidate; it was diametrically opposed between the Socialist Party, Communist Party, and 
Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (Popular Unitary Action Movement, MAPU) all of 
which supported Salvador Allende against the Acción Popular Independiente (Independent 
Popular Action Party, API), Partido Social Democracia de Chile (Social Democratic Party, 
PSD), and Radical Party which supported Rafael Tarud.  Allende, a Marxist, won the 1970 
presidential election.243 
Several authors agree that Salvador Allende’s “road to socialism” was not a peaceful 
one.244  During his presidency, Chile witnessed “the gradual suppression of the opposition press 
and an attempt to crush the bourgeoisie economically, while at the same time favoring the 
working groups which supported him.”245  Thus, the “national conditions” that characterized the 
government under Allende in 1970-1973 were a strong working class, a bourgeois democracy, 
and a dependent economy; Chile was industrial at this time, with 70% of the population 
considered urbanized and with an entrenched bourgeoisie and democratic tradition unique to 
developing countries.  External economic changes in Chile reflect its dependent economy, 
especially when a dictatorship arose in the 1920s because of the collapse of nitrate exports to 
reconstruct the whole political sphere in order to accommodate this shift.  The “national 
frustration” felt in 1970 exemplified the fact that foreign interests took precedence over those of 
the nation.246 
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Allende’s transition to socialism created “transitional costs” which focused on the 
nationalization of copper companies, a raise in minimum wage, land reform, and increased social 
spending; by 1973, the nation’s deficit of 25% was compounded by international economic 
pressures and inflation, resulting in more frequent strikes.247  These policies of nationalization 
weakened Allende’s relations with the other governmental branches, and created favorable 
conditions to carry out a coup d’état. 
James Petras provides an interesting account of Frei’s naivety concerning the military’s 
motivations and the role reversal that occurred leading up to the 1973 coup.  Allende’s 
government was attacked by both the Christian Democrats under Frei as well as the Chilean 
military, for “Frei and his supporters sought means to prevent Allende from taking power, and to 
undermine the economy to prevent his development policies from succeeding.”248  Frei’s original 
intention, according to Petras, was to initiate economic disaster which would call for Allende’s 
impeachment, while the Right would take over with a dictatorship.  Frei wrongly believed that 
the military’s role would be brief and that he would restore democracy after eliminating the 
Leftist parties.249  After the coup, the military gave the factories, banks, and corporations to the 
technocrats (hence becoming a bureaucratic-authoritarian government), directly controlled the 
universities and the media, and put professionals and businessmen in charge of government 
policy.  Clearly, Frei underestimated the “military’s lack of vocation for political office.”250  Paul 
M. Sweezy accounts for another source of ignorance and states that the Unidad Popular was not 
prepared for the armed confrontation on September 11, 1973.  He argues that the Unidad 
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Popular did not push its advantage to entrench its political influence; it simply believed that the 
military would not intervene despite suspicion of coup d’état plots, and was contented with the 
economic successes soon after Allende’s presidential victory.251 
 The military junta exerted their influence by means of terror and obtained legitimacy with 
international loans that further established their power; they entrenched their “political rulership” 
by “physically exterminating the opposition, eliminating deliberative bodies, silencing critics, 
intervening in the universities, and burning books.”252  They used Frei to obtain their power and 
became more permanent with the help of economic resources from the U.S.253  General Augusto 
Pinochet assumed commander of the military regime that was established in 1973, which 
disrupted nearly half a century of democratic elections. 
Healthcare 
 Pinochet’s military dictatorship was “one of the harshest in modern Latin American 
history;”254 however, amidst massacres, arbitrary arrests, censored media, stifled expression, 
declining GDP per capita, and growing poverty and income inequality, his regime continued the 
trend of improving health status and maintaining a health budget in Chile.  Focusing on 
particular programs or targeting specific at-risk groups such as mothers or the indigent, his 
regime made the most efficient use of public social service spending.255  “Chile underscores that 
a country can make good progress at reducing infant mortality even when social spending 
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absorbs a fairly small proportion of GDP” and by focusing on “inexpensive but well designed” 
programs.256 
Despite these successes, the reorganization of the healthcare system into several 
subsystems in 1981 was ultimately detrimental, and may have created the stagnation of IMR 
during period of 1983-1986.257  Another contributing factor to this could be the development of 
the Instituciones de Salud Previsional (Institutes for the Provision of Health, ISAPREs), as they 
“have been accused of pandering to the young, the healthy and the rich” while discriminating 
against women and consuming the majority of healthcare funds for a small fraction of the 
population.  After the ISAPREs were established, much of the population gradually shifted from 
the public Servicio Nacional de Salud (National Health Service, SNS) to private healthcare in 
general.258 
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Figure 4-4: Infant Mortality Rate, per 1,000 live births259 
 
 
Table 4-7: Declining Trend of Chile’s Infant Mortality Rate (in percentage) 
Year 1960-
1965 
1965-
1970 
1970-
1975 
1975-
1980 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
Percent 
Decline 28.27 25.99 25.18 44.62 32.29 19.49 27.39 20.18 
 
Although IMR had already begun to decline after 1960, its steepest decline was during 
this period of militarism.  This boast can largely be attributed to the “public provision of basic 
health services to the poor,” as well as improving access to rural areas, both of which had 
previously been lacking.260  As seen in Table 4-7 above, there is a 45% decline in the five-year 
period of 1975-1980 alone, whereas the five-year periods between 1960 and 1975 witnessed a 
consistent decline of about 25%  each; a similar trend can be seen during the later years of 
Pinochet’s regime (1980-1985), but still not quite as drastic. 
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Figure 4-5: Chile: GDP per capita growth (annual percentage)261 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Chile: GINI Index of Income Inequality262 
 
 
McGuire attributes particular significance to the link between health status and income 
inequality and states that “despite high income inequality, Chile from 1960 to 2005 did better 
than most other developing countries at meeting the basic needs of the least advantaged sectors 
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of the population.”263  It can be seen in the three figures above that while GDP per capita 
significantly plummeted in 1975, IMR was amidst its sharpest decline.  Additionally, income 
inequality (although there is a lack of data from 1975) seen an overall rise from 1970 to 1980. 
Under Pinochet, Chile focused on literacy and education enrollment, potable water, 
improved sanitation methods, and family planning especially the formation of the APROFA that 
reduced abortion rates and decreased fertility rates since 1962.  “If there is a lesson to be learned 
from the military government’s health care policies, it is not to privatize health insurance, but 
rather to improve the quality and accessibility of publicly funded primary care.”264  The evidence 
strongly suggests that increased education (particularly among women) in spite of low GDP and 
high income inequality can improve the health status of a country.  This, of course, is not to 
discredit or eliminate the implementation of social service programs. 
 
Figure 4-7: Chile: Percentage of population completed primary and secondary (age 15+)265 
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McGuire calls the counterintuitive juxtaposition of military dictatorship and improved 
health as the “Pinochet Paradox,” but the situation is not unlike that of Nicaragua.  Like 
Nicaragua, Chile found that such factors as discussed above directly influence IMR.  Particularly 
influential is the shift of focus from hospitals to community centers, as seen during Allende’s 
rule, which decreased IMR from 82% to 66%.266  Although this met with antagonism from 
white-collar workers and private physicians that eventually contributed to his overthrow, it set 
the tone for the continuance of health programs and initiatives throughout the military regime.   
 When determining the coup’s influence on healthcare, it is important to note that Chile 
already maintained a progressive healthcare system prior to the revolution and coup, and that the 
population had already recognized their right to proper health.267  Additionally, McGuire argues 
that authoritarian states like Pinochet’s Chile tend to adopt a paternalistic quality that 
consequently improves healthcare by prioritizing the needs of mothers and children.268  The 
health situation seemed not to have been significantly affected by the coup; however, the coup 
did indeed halt some of the APROFA’s efforts and led to the disappearance and imprisonment of 
physicians and faculty members of medical schools.  Despite these tragic setbacks, fertility and 
maternal mortality continued to decline and the employment of nurses, midwives, and 
nutritionists increased.269  As with Nicaragua, the juxtaposition between a repressive regime with 
an accompanying coup and the continued improvement of health status is indeed 
counterintuitive. 
                                                 
266
 McGuire, 108. 
267
 Reichard, 82-83; McGuire, 115. 
268
 McGuire, 115. 
269
 McGuire, 102; 108. 
  
80 
 
Timeline 
Similar to the Nicaraguan timeline, Chile’s timeline begins with its independence in 1818 
and ends in 2000.  Again, it will incorporate health-related and sociopolitical occurrences.270 
 
Table 4-8: Chilean Political and Medical Timeline 
Independence 
1818 February 12: Chile becomes independent with O’Higgins as supreme leader. 
1823-30 O’Higgins forced to resign; civil war between liberal federalists and conservative centralists ends with 
conservative victory. 
1835 February 20: Concepcion is destroyed by an earthquake. 
1839 January 20: Confederation of Peru and Bolivia is defeated at the Battle of Yungay. 
1851-61 President Manuel Montt liberalizes constitution and reduces privileges of landowners and church. 
1879-84 Chile increases its territory by one third after it defeats Peru and Bolivia in War of the Pacific. 
Late 19th Pacification of Araucanians paves way for European immigration; large-scale mining of nitrate and 
copper begins. 
1891 Civil war over constitutional dispute between president and congress ends in congressional victory, 
with president reduced to figurehead. 
1904 October 20: The War of the Pacific ends with a treaty between Bolivia and Chile. 
1907 3,000 miners and their families were massacred by national troops after demonstrating in Iquinque. 
1925 New constitution increases presidential powers and separates church and state. 
1927 General Carlos Ibanez del Campo seizes power and establishes dictatorship. 
1938-46 Communists, Socialists and Radicals form Popular Front coalition and introduce economic policies 
based on US New Deal. 
1939 January 24: Over 28,000 people perished in a 8.3 earthquake in Chillan, Chile. 
1948-58 Communist Party banned. 
1952 General Carlos Ibanez elected president with promise to strengthen law and order. 
The Chilean National Health Service (SNS) is established. 
1964 Eduardo Frei Montalva, Christian Democrat, elected president and introduces cautious social reforms, 
but fails to curb inflation. 
1967 October: President Johnson named Edward M. Korry to serve as the U.S. ambassador to Chile.  Korry 
served until 1971 and was kept ignorant by the Nixon administration of plans for a coup. 
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Marxists take power and nationalize. 
Pinochet Dictatorship 
1970 September 4: Salvador Allende becomes world’s first democratically elected Marxist president and 
embarks on an extensive program of nationalization and radical social reform. 
September 11: Henry Kissinger discusses a “covert action program” to oust Allende. 
September 15: President Nixon authorizes a U.S.-backed coup in Chile (failed attempt). 
December 31: President Allende nationalizes the Chilean coal mines. 
1971 December 1: Students begin a 2-day demonstration in Santiago against Allende’s government.  The 
government responds by banning student demonstrations and declared a state of emergency. 
1973 July 13: A strike begins, involving more than a million workers demanding Allende’s resignation; the 
strike lasts until the coup. 
September 11: General Augusto Pinochet ousts Allende in CIA-sponsored coup and proceeds to 
establish a brutal dictatorship. 
September 21: 300 students were killed at a technical university when they announced they would not 
surrender to the military (based on a report made declassified in 1999). 
October 17: Winston Cabello Bravo, Allende’s chief economic planner where copper mines were to 
become nationalized, was fatally shot among other political prisoners. 
1974 A military intelligence agency is created, known for committing numerous human rights abuses. 
June 27: Pinochet declares himself “Supreme Chief of the Nation.” 
December 11: Pinochet takes the title of president of the republic. 
1980 October 21: Pinochet issues a constitution that allows him to remain in power until 1988. 
1981 May 1: Social Security becomes privatized. 
1983 Pinochet reacts to protests with strong repression. 
1985 February 5: the U.S. halts a loan to Chile in protest over human right abuses. 
1988 Pinochet loses a referendum on whether he should remain in power. 
1989-90 Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin wins presidential election; General Pinochet steps down in 1990 as 
head of state but remains commander-in-chief of the army. 
1990 Inflation hits 26%. 
1994-95 Eduardo Frei succeeds Aylwin as president and begins to reduce the military’s influence in government. 
Pinochet’s Aftermath 
1998 General Pinochet retires from the army and is made senator for life but is arrested in the UK at the 
request of Spain on murder charges. 
August 19: Chile’s senate approved a bill to abolish the national holiday marking the 1973 coup 
against President Allende.  A Unity day was proclaimed instead to begin in 1999. 
2000 March: British Home Secretary Jack Straw decides that General Pinochet is not fit to be extradited.  
General Pinochet returns to Chile. 
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Socialist Ricardo Lagos is elected president. 
2000+ Chilean courts strip General Pinochet of his immunity from prosecution several times, but attempts to 
make him stand trial for alleged human rights offences fail, with judges usually citing concerns over 
the general’s health. 
 
Comparative Remarks 
Nicaragua’s “modernizing authoritarian regime” under Somoza drained state resources, 
which created a strain on the societal balance and slowly eroded both the legitimacy of state 
authority and the loyalty of the elite;271 a neopatrimonial state arose.  As Johnson indicated, a 
“conjunction” of occurrences such as inflation, nationalism, and increased corruption exacerbate 
the cause for revolution.  Nicaragua’s revolution in 1979 witnessed a significant change in its 
societal and class structure and can thus be considered a social revolution as defined by 
Sanderson’s criteria, albeit loosely when aligned with the theories of Johnson and Brinton.  “The 
originality of the Nicaraguan revolution was that, for the first time in Latin America, it joined 
rural guerrilla warfare, urban insurrection, general strikes, political work among peasants and 
workers, and the support of important sectors of the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and the 
church.”272  According to Sederberg’s criteria (see Tables 1-1 and 1-2), Nicaragua witnessed a 
significant reorganization of its class structure by means of coercion, and became a 
semidemocratic state (according to the classification of Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán).  
Chile dramatically changed from a democratic polity to a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, the 
opposite of Nicaragua, yet it also witnessed a conjunction of occurrences; however, its history 
was complicated with democratic electoral competition and a higher emphasis on economic 
dependency.273  Moreover, Polity IV accounts for factionalism in Chile from 1945 until the 
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revolution in 1973, despite its democratic polity, and factionalism in Nicaragua from 1979-1983 
and 1985-2007.274  Although this factionalism may dramatically impact the political 
circumstances in each country, giving rise to or as a result of a revolution, it is again apparent 
that the health status was largely unaffected; this is particularly true for Nicaragua. 
 The two main hypotheses that connect public health and political science, is the (1) 
“wealthier is healthier” approach that emphasizes “economic output and purchasing power,” and 
the (2) “social service provision” that emphasizes government programs and basic healthcare.  
Each hypothesis has a different implication for policy-making, as the former would focus on 
economic growth acceleration while the latter would focus on “basic social services to the 
poor.”275  While purchasing power is not always feasible, providing social services is less 
expensive and realistic.  McGuire argues that “public provision of basic social services does 
better than income-related indicators at explaining the pattern and pace of infant mortality 
decline,” particularly for Chile.276  This also applies quite well to Nicaragua due to the 
implementation of similar inexpensive programs. 
Both Nicaragua and Chile shared the implementation of socialism (for which they lost 
U.S. support), a large disparity between the urban and rural populations, and the prioritization of 
healthcare.277  They both demonstrated success in health through improved community 
participation, education, literacy, preventative health, political awareness among the population 
(which increased expectations about the right to health), and access to rural areas.  For Chile in 
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particular, “long-term democratic experience changes citizen expectations.”278  Also, in light of 
low (Nicaragua) or decreasing (Chile) GDP, both countries managed to decrease IMR and 
increase LE.  Crude death rates provide additional insight into the effect that the revolution and 
coup had on health status.  Similar in pattern to LE, the crude death rate did not increase rapidly 
but rather continued to decrease in spite of the event.  It can be seen with Nicaragua that it did 
not continue at the same pace as prior to the revolution, but it still declined nevertheless. 
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Figure 4-8: Nicaragua: Life Expectancy279 
 
 
Figure 4-9: Chile: Life Expectancy280 
 
 
Figure 4-10: Nicaragua: Crude Death Rate, per 1,000281 
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280
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Figure 4-11: Chile: Crude Death Rate, per 1,000282 
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V. Conclusions 
This study examined whether revolutions and/or coups d’état influence the adoption of 
healthcare policies and subsequently the health status of the country in which the revolution took 
place.  It was hypothesized that a revolution, especially one that is accompanied by a coup d’état, 
would have a negative impact on healthcare.  This was not the case in Nicaragua and Chile, 
albeit quite counterintuitively. 
Six factors influence the effect on health, including (1) revolution type, (2) coup d’état 
type, (3) regime type and change, (4) prior existence and permanence of healthcare policies, (5) 
population expectation of their right to health, and (6) economic standing. 
 The classification of both revolution and coup d’état has an impact, albeit minimally, on 
healthcare.  Although the revolutions of both Nicaragua and Chile can be deemed actual 
“revolutions” according to the more inclusive definitions, they yet cannot compare to the “grand” 
or “total” revolutions of centuries past; indeed, the level of violence and destruction is far less 
than that of the French or Chinese Revolutions.  The accompanying coups d’état in Nicaragua 
and Chile can also be considered “coups,” as the chief executive of the country was indeed 
ousted and replaced; however, both were in the category of an autogolpe (self-coup), a 
resignation of the leader, which is itself less violent than an assassination or total decimation of 
the leadership.  An autogolpe can achieve what it needs politically without the excessive 
violence, and thus does not affect the health system beyond repair. 
A more significant factor is regime change, since the government and public health are 
inherently interrelated.  It is not necessarily the actual revolution or coup that affects the post-
revolution healthcare infrastructure, but rather the new regime and the policies it sets to 
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establish.283  Both Nicaragua and Chile have demonstrated that regime change, be it democratic 
to authoritarian or authoritarian to semi-democracy, positively affected health despite their 
governmental differences; the main difference between democracy or semi-democracy and 
traditional authoritarian or bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes concerning health should be 
insignificant. 
 Furthermore, Chile already upheld a lower infant mortality rate (IMR) with a steeper 
decline around the regime change (Chile had a 44% decline around the revolution compared to 
Nicaragua’s 22%), lower crude death rate, higher GDP, higher life expectancy (LE), and a higher 
percentage of the population with primary and secondary education (see Figures listed in Section 
IV) than Nicaragua; these numbers even continued to exceed those of Nicaragua’s in the post-
revolution regime, despite its authoritative typology.  Economic standing is also an insufficient 
explanation for such health successes.  Although the “wealthier is healthier” hypothesis is 
certainly valid, it is not the case with Nicaragua and Chile.  In both cases, IMR continued to 
decrease and LE continued to increase despite a revolution, coup, declining GDP, increasing 
income inequality, and a repressive authoritarian government. 
The evidence presented in this study indicates: (1) the implementation of inexpensive 
government programs (the “social services provision” hypothesis as indicated by McGuire) that 
target at-risk populations, the poor, and the rural sector are most effective at improving the health 
status of a country during economic slumps; (2) the regime prior to the revolution can have a 
significant influence on healthcare, especially if the pre-revolution regime is a democracy with 
extant high expectations of the population as seen with Chile (this can extend to the post-
revolution regime as well, as with Nicaragua, in which the population gradually attained these 
expectations); (3) the permanence of primary healthcare systems before the revolution can 
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withstand economic fluctuation that is accompanied or even caused by a revolution and coup 
d’état.  The revolution and coup, as seen with both Nicaragua and Chile, at most created 
temporary stagnation of health status for one to three years.  It is the prioritization of cost-
efficient and target-specific healthcare policies, in spite of or even initiated by revolution and 
regime change, which continued to improve the health status of each country.  Instability and 
ideology in a regime alone do not create an adoption of healthcare policies; weak and unstable 
regimes cannot successfully centralize or integrate healthcare policies, particularly if they depend 
on foreign aid. 
It must be noted that the additional factors of culture or religion not included in this study 
may influence health status.  The Church’s “political demands for human rights, 
democratization, and social justice,” could have had a significant impact on public health, as well 
as its ban on disseminating the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases.284  A possible positive 
influence (apart from culture or religion) could be the invention of the “safer” synthetic vaccine 
which can withstand warmer temperatures for longer hours and eliminate the risk of the 
vaccine’s reversion to an infectious form; this invention is able to withstand the conditions of 
healthcare centers in remote rural areas, thus improving the health status for that population.285 
Cuba would have been an insightful addition to this comparative study; Horn states that 
like Chile and Nicaragua, Cuba has made healthcare a priority and thus dramatically improved 
the health status of the country.  It would be interesting to see how Cuba, a country that had 
minimal fluctuation in polity and also maintained a socialist state, achieved such high standards 
and results in the health arena. 
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